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1 Introduction 
Citizens, policymakers and social scientists often call for citizen participation for reasons of 
democratic legitimacy and effectiveness. A field in which this has been vigorously claimed is 
science and technology policy. Thus, many countries witnessed the introduction of 
Participatory Technology Assessment (PTA). The "litmus test" of PTA and of citizen 
participation, however, is their impact on policy making. But can PTA keep its promises and 
increase the influence of citizens' voices on decision-making? What in actual fact is the 
impact of PTA on decision-making? How can we increase it? 
In order to answer these questions the project "Impact of Citizen Participation on Decision 
Making in a Knowledge Intensive Policy Field" (CIT-PART) comparatively studies the impact 
of PTA and technology assessment (TA) on policy making in Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Italy, Latvia, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the European 
Commission, the OECD and the Holy See. Thereof the project draws conclusions about the 
potential impact of institutionalized citizen participation at EU level. 
This project addresses these questions through the reactions of various political systems to 
the challenge of xenotransplantation, which stands for the transplantation of animal organs, 
tissues or cells into humans. Xenotransplantation is highly controversial: Its advocates 
perceive it as promising since it could help to remedy the shortage of human transplants. Its 
opponents insist that it involves too many risks - most prominently infection from animals to 
humans - and ethical questions. 
By adopting a theoretical approach of “social practices” this project makes the assumption 
that the impact of citizen participation on decision-making is not only dependent on the 
quality of the PTA process itself but on practices of policymakers in which PTA is embedded. 
Following from this theoretical approach, the project applies qualitative methods of empirical 
research. 
1.1 Case selection 
Although the OECD, unlike nation states and the EU, for the most part lacks regulatory 
competence and, unlike the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, has almost no 
financial means to advance its policies, it nevertheless plays an important role in 
international policy as an intergovernmental platform for the exchange and promotion of 
policy ideas and instruments. As a hybrid between an expert and an intergovernmental 
organization and as has been mentioned largely devoid of money and laws that as 
generalized symbolic media could promote its policies, the OECD is forced to apply much 
softer measures. It is limited to providing expertise and knowledge and, as political scientist 
Martin Marcussen put it, to playing the “idea game” to reach its objectives (Marcussen 2004). 
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Jörg Dostal’s analysis of OECD labor market policy also provides an illustrative case of how 
the OECD employs knowledge to promote its policy ideas. He uses the example of the 
Directorate for Education Employment Labor and Social Affairs (DEELSA) to describe how 
the OECD frequently acts as an initiator in promoting ideas, thus preparing “the ground for 
subsequent (…) regulation” at the national and EU level (Dostal 2004: 445). 
By playing the idea game, the OECD often enters into emerging policy fields with the 
objective to create awareness for, as well as coordination and harmonization of, national 
policies at the international level. The OECD also acted in this way in the case of 
xenotransplantation. It’s Working Party on Biotechnology (WPB), a subcommittee of the 
Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy (CSTP), addressed xenotransplantation as 
early as 1995 as an emerging policy issue. This engagement followed its previous activities 
regarding human health related applications of biotechnology (OECD Observer 1999). The 
instruments the OECD applied were:  
 writing and circulating policy papers (OECD 1996, OECD 1999a, OECD/WHO 
2000);  
 organizing two conferences: the New York Workshop and a OECD/WHO 
Consultation in Paris in 1998 and 2000, respectively, which assembled experts and 
policy-makers from Member and Non-Member States and international 
organizations; 
 setting up a data bank of xenotransplantation policies in its Member States; and 
 forging links with Member State governments, the WHO (OECD 1999b) and the 
Council of Europe on this matter. 
As will be described in this paper, the OECD focused on the discussion of recent scientific 
developments, the assessment of the socio-economic costs and benefits of 
xenotransplantation and its alternatives as well as the establishment of standards and 
infrastructures for international xenotransplantation surveillance. To a much lesser extent it 
discussed the ethical problems posed by xenotransplantation. The OECD terminated its 
activities in 2001, leaving international policy making deliberately to the WHO, as it already 
suggested in its first policy paper in 1996 (OECD 1996: 22). 
Although the OECD shares little commonalities with nation states, analyzed in other CIT-
PART case studies, it is an important case for this research project. An analysis of the 
OECD provides the chance to examine a crucial aspect of science and technology policy in 
general and xenotransplantation policies in particular, i.e. its international dynamics. 
Regulation of xenotransplantation does not only occur at the national level. It is also critically 
influenced by international discussion at the OECD, the Council of Europe and the WHO. 
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The OECD created a platform for policymakers from nation states and international 
organizations as well as experts from public research and private industry to promote 
exchange and policy learning. In this way, national and international xenotransplantation 
policies became interconnected. 
A second aspect of the international dynamics of xenotransplantation research and 
regulation relates to the particular difficulties of realizing citizen participation in science and 
technology policy at the international level. Practicing citizen participation is already a 
demanding exercise for national governments but how can highly complex international and 
supranational bureaucracies cope with this challenge? The OECD case provides an 
opportunity to examine these questions. 
1.2 Methods 
As Porter and Webb point out, the OECD received little attention in the international relations 
literature (Porter/Webb 2007: 2). Existing analysis often focuses on the OECD’s role in 
international welfare and labor market policies (Salzman 2000, Noaksson/Jacobsoson 2003, 
Armingeon/Beyeler 2004, Dostal 2004). An exception to this is Mahon and McBride’s edited 
volume on the OECD, which not only assembles research on different policy fields – 
including biotechnology (Drouillard/Gold 2008) - but also focuses on the organization’s role 
as actor in global governance (Mahon/McBride 2008). Literature on the OECD’s 
xenotransplantation policies is also very limited. Existing work mainly remains descriptive, 
summarizing the OECD’s positions without analyzing the policy process (Paslack 2008, 
Hüsing et al. 1998, Hüsing 2004). The case study takes this literature into account. 
A second type of material this case study is based on is official OECD documents (OECD 
1996, 1999, 2000, OECD/WHO 2001). 
A third source were eleven interviews with civil servants and researchers from OECD 
Member States and the OECD who were previously, and/or currently affiliated to this 
organization as temporary experts, permanent Secretariat staff or members of Committees, 
Working Parties and the Council. A criterion for their recruitment was knowledge about the 
OECD’s xenotransplantation policies in particular and more generally about its science and 
technology policies as well as experience with the OECD as an organization. 
Interview partners were recruited by applying a snowball system. In a first round two 
researchers were interviewed who worked as experts at the OECD for several years and 
dealt with science and health policies respectively. These interviews, carried out in the 
summer of 2010, provided first insights into the OECD’s makeup as an organization and 
helped to identify more interview partners. Thereafter, two civil servants of a Member State 
were interviewed, who acted as liaisons between their national civil service and the OECD. 
These interviews revealed more information about the interplay between Member States and 
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the OECD in policy making. They also resulted in additional informants. These interviews 
were followed by a research trip to the OECD headquarters in Paris in October 2010, which 
included two interviews with Directorate staff and three interviews with representatives of a 
Member State. Data collection, in terms of interviews, was finalized in the spring of 2011 with 
interviews with two Member State delegates, who served as members of the OECD’s 
Working Party on Biotechnology. 
With one exception the interviews were carried out face to face. One interview was carried 
out as a telephone interview for economic reasons. Interviews were based on a guideline 
shared by all CIT-PART partners which was derived from the methodological guidebook and 
was adapted according to necessity, primarily the interviewee’s position in the OECD and 
his/her direct involvement with xenotransplantation policies.
1
 The interviews lasted between 
approximately thirty minutes to one hour; almost all of them were taped and fully transcribed. 
Two interviewees requested that their interviews were not be taped for reasons of 
confidentiality. In these cases records were produced immediately after the interview. 
Transcripts and records were analyzed by qualitative methods (thematic analysis). 
Interviews were used to describe the OECD’s xenotransplantation policies and to examine 
social practices of policy making, technology assessment and citizen participation. In a first 
round of analysis, themes were identified in each interview. In a second round, these themes 
were compared across interviews and theories were synthesized. Thematic analysis was 
supported by Atlas.ti, a software tool specifically developed for qualitative analysis.
 
Interviews are quoted within the text. Roman numbers in brackets refer to the interview, 
while the numbers refer to the relevant lines within the transcript or record. 
1.3 Acknowledgements 
First of all I am most grateful to the European Commission for funding this research project. 
In addition I want to thank all interview partners for their unhesitating and welcoming 
readiness to participate in the project. Without their friendly and open support this research 
would have simply been impossible. I also want to thank Claudia Jandrisic for transcription 
and Alexander Lang for compiling and categorizing a participant list of the New York 
Workshop and the OECD/WHO Consultation. I particularly want to thank Karina Weitzer for 
transcription and language editing. Finally I want to acknowledge Peter Biegelbauer for his 
valuable comments on a draft version of this paper. 
1.4 Layout of the paper 
The paper starts with a description of the OECD as an organization (chapter 2) and 
continues with an outline of OECD xenotransplantation policies (chapter 3). It describes its 
development from the first background paper to an official joint document of the OECD and 
                                                     
1
 See Annex 
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WHO. Chapter 4 summarizes the role of different actors in this policy process. Chapter 5 
analyses important social practices in the area of policy making as well as citizen 
participation. The concluding section (chapter 6) recapitulates the main findings and 
addresses the main research questions of the CIT-PART project. 
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2 The OECD as an Organization 
This chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the OECD as an organization. It portrays its 
mission as being a policy forum, think tank and policy advisor on the topics it deals with. The 
section continues by highlighting the features of the OECD that characterize it as an 
intrinsically political organization and concludes with a description of its organizational 
structure. 
2.1 Mission 
The OECD was established in 1961. It is the successor institution to the Organization for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which was established in postwar Europe to co-
ordinate the Marshall Plan, which aimed to achieve economic reconstruction after World 
War II (OECD 2008, Noaksson/Jacobsson 2003: 11ff., Wolfe 2008). Thus, the OECD’s 
mission is primarily economic, i.e. to “help governments achieve sustainable economic 
growth and employment and rising standards of living in member countries while maintaining 
financial stability, so contributing to the development of the world economy” (OECD 2008: 9). 
The OECD is a hybrid between an expert and political organization. As an informant put it, it 
"is intrinsically a political organization but I see the advisory function, the think tank function, 
this information and advisory function very much in the foreground" (v: 308-310). Dostal 
captures the main features of the OECD as an expert and political organization in a nutshell: 
“The OECD has features of an international civil service, a think-tank and a shared state 
apparatus, and is based on the broad representation of advanced industrialized countries. 
(…) Its internal structure is intergovernmental, with a ministerial council as the most 
important formal decision-making organ and permanent national representatives working on 
policy proposal alongside the organization’s professional staff” (Dostal 2004: 446). 
The following section is dedicated to unfolding the meaning of Dostal’s solid characterization. 
2.1.1 Policy Forum 
The OECD is “a permanent conference of governments” (Oborne 1999: xiv), a policy forum 
to exchange policies between Member States. It describes itself as a “unique forum where 
the governments of 30 market economies work together to address the economic, social and 
governance challenges of globalization as well as to exploit its opportunities” (OECD 2008: 
7). It “provides a setting for reflection and discussion, based on policy research and analysis 
that helps governments shape policy that may lead to a formal agreement among member 
governments or be acted on in domestic or other international fora” (ibid.: 13). The OECD 
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does this by comparing policy experiences, seeking answers to common problems, 
identifying good practice and co-coordinating domestic and international policies (c.f. ibid. 7). 
In the field of biotechnology, an interview partner likewise described the OECD as „a policy 
forum on biotechnologies" (iv: 5-6). The OECD also played this role in international 
xenotransplantation policies. As one interviewee recalled, it brought together policymakers 
and researchers from academia and industry to exchange knowledge and to learn about 
recent developments in research and policy making: 
"It was an area where the knowledge base seemed to be concentrated primarily in the US 
and the UK and there was a need to understand how the private sector also was moving 
around it. (…) So these are also ways for government to dialogue with industry, and 
understand what is happening; dialogue with science, dialogue with academia, dialogue with 
industry and it becomes a policy forum. And it can become also a foresight forum. So this 
was a mixture of foresight forum and of policy forum" (iv: 262-268). 
This OECD expert described the learning effects of such an exchange between civil servants 
and experts: “suddenly (…) you have dialogue and you start to compare the practices that 
you´re having around in all the various countries" (iv: 453-460). Another respondent 
described how this mutual learning process by comparison also had an impact on national 
policies: "The OECD is a policy advisory organization in which experts from nation states 
meet to present examples of their policies to others and by this mutual presentation, work 
out insights und carry them back again and possibly say: 'well, they do this a bit better, they 
have found a solution to that problem'. To work, in a way, to advise policy and reforms" (vii: 
107-111). 
The New York Workshop on xenotransplantation, organized by the OECD, worked in the 
same way: "it brought together the policymakers with the experts and with, what are called, 
non-government-organizations" (x: 39-42). This "information exchange” was important “so 
that we could have a common understanding of the risks, the ethical issues and the potential 
benefits" (x: 86-88). For this interview partner, the benefit of the OECD’s contribution 
consisted of acting as such a policy forum on xenotransplantation policies nationally and 
internationally. 
2.1.2 Expert Organisation and Think tank 
The OECD was often characterized as “think tank” (v: 23) or “policy think tank” (ix: 3), which 
allows Member States to exchange strategies on economic policy (ii: 49-52), or as "a 
coordination organization in economic policy" (v: 5-6, 144). The OECD was also frequently 
described as an "expert organization" (iii: 171, 633-634) or "an expert organization 
addressing governmental structures" (ii: 5-6) that answers questions it is asked (c.f. ii: 26-
27). 
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The OECD fulfills these functions with its Secretariat staff of about 2.000 "experts" (v: 147) of 
"international civil servants” (v: 141), the "backbone" of the organization (v: 134). As one 
interviewee put it, the Secretariat is the “vitally important machinery” of the OECD, which 
drives and facilitates much of its very technical and specialist work (c.f., x: 150-155). 
The majority of the Secretariat’s experts are economists but there are also social and natural 
scientists as well as engineers (interview ii: 13-16). These do not deal with typical public 
administration but provide "intellectual capital" (v: 143-144). They are well connected with 
international expert networks in academia, policy making and private research in which they 
have been trained and have worked. However, not only members of the Secretariat staff are 
experts in their field, Committee Members, who have been working in their national 
ministries for years on a particular topic, can be considered as experts in their own right as 
well (vii: 115-122). Both types of OECD staff contribute to the OECD’s role as an expert 
organization. 
This close network of experts, consisting of Secretariat experts and national civil servants, 
also carries a risk. There is, according to one civil servant, a strong basis to claims that the 
OECD is an ivory tower in which scientists and experts talk to one another and that OECD 
documents are primarily read by this limited group of people (vii: 83-84). 
2.1.3 Policy Advisor 
The OECD’s mission is not restricted to being an expert organization, it has a particular 
addressee; it is an "advisory organization to politics" (vii: 94-95), an "expert organization 
embedded into public administration and politics" (vii: 100). It is not just another research 
organization, but, as an interview partner explained, a pragmatic organization that tries to 
find out what projects are practical, feasible and fundable for politics (vii: 101-102). The 
OECD differs from ordinary research institutions because of its close intertwinement with 
Member State administrations. The Secretariat regularly discusses its research with civil 
servants from Member States (iii: 157-162). A respondent emphasized the importance of this 
constant mutual exchange: 
"It is most essential, (…) that they not only do research, but that twice a year there is a 
Committee in which these papers are presented, discussed and people are simply invited to 
give their opinion, what they think, what the national experiences are, and so on; and by that 
[process] the accumulated knowledge is also fed back. So, I am now talking a little bit about 
the way that it should be" (iii: 160-168). 
Another informant used an economic metaphor to describe the relationship between 
policymakers and OECD experts, distinguishing between consumers of advice – i.e. 
government bureaucracies - and suppliers – i.e. the Secretariat. Consumers put topics on 
the agenda and use the experts’ work (ii: 6-7). Another civil servant used a similar metaphor 
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and described the Committees as "customers" or "clients" of a respective Directorate 
(v: 202-203). 
2.1.4 Political Organization 
For several reasons the OECD is not simply a remote expert organization and policy advisor, 
but also and intrinsically a highly political organization: 
First, the OECD is not only an exchange platform for information, it is also an organization 
"where political decisions are made" (interview i: 99). Since these are made in sensitive 
areas, various governmental and non-governmental actors try to influence them at the 
domestic and international level. Although the OECD only uses soft regulation for the most 
part, its recommendations and guidelines nevertheless have an impact on national policies. 
OECD documents can justify or discredit domestic politics and therefore become ammunition 
in domestic and international political debate. Member States can decide to transform 
recommendations and guidelines either into national law or not (ix: 43-49). Moreover, there 
is a certain peer pressure to follow policies (e.g., Noaksson/Jacobsson 2003, Marcussen 
2004, Mahon/McBridge 2009). 
Second, the OECD is inherently an "etatist" organization; its members are national 
governments, and it is also governments who are addressees of the OECD’s advice (ix: 38-
40). 
The OECD therefore, and this is the third argument, has an "international governance 
structure" (v: 155), which corresponds with, is derived from, and closely linked to government 
structures and hierarchies in Member States. In the words of a respondent, "the OECD is 
nothing other than (…) a supranational bureaucracy" (i: 79-81). Hierarchies in domestic 
public administration, e.g., are reflected in the OECD’s structure. There is a particular order 
in which civil servants of particular seniority are delegated to OECD bodies. Ministers 
participate in the annual Council meeting or in Council meetings for special ministries; 
ambassadors participate in regular Council meetings; their deputies participate in the 
Executive Committee; civil servants of various seniority levels from relevant ministries 
participate in Committees and Working Groups (iii: 032-052). Specialists, who are experts in 
the topics discussed, participate in the most basic working groups; the Task Forces (see 
2.3.2). 
Fourth, reports and documents must pass through the lengthy and complicated process of 
the OECD’s internal governance structure. Once they pass “declassification” (see 5.1.4.), 
they are official OECD documents and “very close to governments”. This close interaction 
between state bureaucracies and experts increases the chances that policy advice is 
actually implemented because it has been negotiated with, and is directly addressed to 
governments: "there are layers and layers of oversight but the strength of something like this 
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is that once you come out with something and it is approved at the highest layer then it is out 
there, it is in government, straight in government, which is not the case, for example, with the 
World Health Organization which hires, you know, experts but they don´t have the sort of 
bureaucratic layer with government people" (iv: 136-140, emphasis in the original). 
Negotiation and declassification confers an official status onto OECD policy papers. As an 
informant put it, "all of these papers (…) are negotiated. This means that this is a negotiated 
final report that countries have agreed to and they approve for declassification" (iv: 145-149). 
Finally, the OECD is highly political because of its framing as an expert organization and the 
intrinsic ideology of this claim. According to a civil servant, the OECD gives itself the image 
of an apolitical and essentially science and evidence based organization and by doing so is 
highly political, since the intrinsic assumptions and ideology of a certain kind of expertise are 
rarely discussed. This has been shown for economic policy (Noaksson/Jacobsson 2003) but 
also holds true for xenotransplantation policy, which provides privileged access to scientific 
experts, government actors and industry representatives and the application oriented 
questions these groups address. 
2.2 Different Policy Issues 
Given its economic point of reference the OECD deals with a remarkably broad range of 
issues. OECD Directorates, Committees, Working Parties and Task Forces are concerned 
with almost all policy areas with the exception of defense and culture (ix: 35-36). Because of 
its mission in economic policy, the OECD focuses on all of these policy fields from an 
economic perspective (ix: 35-36). However, there is a hierarchy of policy fields because 
some areas are more central concerns to the organization than others. Interview partners 
repeatedly referred to the regular economic surveys of Member States as the OECD’s core 
tasks (iii: 093-097). As a former OECD expert explained: "that’s virtually the core of the 
OECD, the core mandate is to write reports twice a year on the economic policy of OECD 
countries and to advise governments, (...) to give guidance; that's the core task" (i: 54-58). 
These economic country reports are the OECD’s "standard and flag ship" activities (v: 64) 
and belong to its most prestigious core mission. Macroeconomics, according to a senior 
diplomat, is at the center of OECD interest (ix: 13). Whether topics are considered important 
and are therefore discussed between Member States more deeply and with more emphasis 
depends on their proximity to economics and core state interests (v: 83-87). Biotechnology in 
comparison to economics is a rather new and highly specialized issue with relatively little 
political relevance from the OECD’s perspective. It is a "boundary area", which was never on 
the agenda at the highest level of Council meetings (ix: 17-23). However, the status of a 
topic can significantly change as the examples of the Program for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) and science and technology policy show. Both topics progressed from a 
relatively marginal position to the center of OECD’s activities. 
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2.3 Organizational Structure 
The formal internal governance structure has been exhaustively described (e.g, OECD 
2008). The following section will therefore be limited to a short description of the formal 
structure. The OECD is composed of several organizational bodies that serve different 
functions, i.e. the Council, the Committees and their sub-units (Working Parties and Task 
Forces) as well as the Secretariat. 
2.3.1 Council 
The Council is the OECD’s highest decision-making body. It is staffed with one permanent 
representative per Member State and one representative of the European Commission. 
Permanent representatives are diplomats and act as liaisons between the OECD 
governance structure and their national governments. Once a year the Council meets at the 
ministerial level to “discuss key issues and set priorities for OECD work” (OECD 2008: 11). 
Among other topics this meeting decides on the budget, which amounts to around 
340 Million a year (ibid. 12). 
2.3.2 Committees, Working Parties, Task Forces 
Other bodies within the OECD are the so-called Committees and their sub-divisions, the 
Working Parties and Task Forces. Member State representatives meet in about 200 of these 
Committees, Working Groups as well as Task Forces, where they discuss policy ideas and 
review progress in specific policy areas. Each year about 40,000 senior officials from 
national governments participate in meetings of these OECD bodies (c.f. OECD 2008: 11). 
There are different kinds of Committees. Standing Committees are the OECD’s political 
superstructure (vii: 222); they consist of, e.g., the Executive Committee, the Budget 
Committee, the External Relations Committee, the Committee on Public Affairs and 
Communication. Other Committees deal with specific topics such as, to name only a few, 
economic policy, environment, development, trade, agriculture, education, and transport. 
Committees are composed of national delegates, which are either civil servants of the 
responsible national ministries or experts from outside government, who have been 
nominated by Member States, either because of the particular specificity of a topic or 
because the responsible civil servant is simply too busy (ii: 9-13, iii: 19-25, iii: 21-22). The 
Committee relevant for OECD xenotransplantation policies was the Committee for Scientific 
and Technological Policy (CSTP). 
In order to carry out the more specific work, Committees establish so called Working Parties. 
The latter are staffed with civil servants and experts, which act as "peers" of the Directorate’s 
experts (v: 297-305). The responsible Working Party for xenotransplantation was the 
I H S — Griessler / OECD Xenotransplantation Policies and Public Participation — 12 
 
Working Party on Biotechnology and the Working Party on Human Health Related 
Biotechnology (WPB, see 2.3.3). 
There is yet another level of bodies: the so-called Task Forces. They are established 
informally for a fixed period of time and are exclusively composed of experts. In the case of 
xenotransplantation, such a Task Force or Informal Expert Group was established.
2
 
Figure 1: Representation of Political and Technical Aspects in OECD 
 
(Source: Interview vii) 
Councils, Committees and Working Parties differ in regards to types and seniorities of their 
members. The Council is a purely political body composed of ambassadors, who have very 
little knowledge about the specifics discussed in Committees and Working Parties. They deal 
with the general governance of the OECD as well as fundamental and highly political 
decisions. Committees are composed of a mixture of experts and civil servants. They are the 
bodies, which, e.g. decide on specific work programs and declassification of documents. But 
they still mostly lack the specific expert knowledge about the issues discussed in Working 
Parties and Task Forces. Working Parties and Task Forces are almost entirely staffed by 
experts (v: 11-15). This stratification is also reflected by the kind of Secretariat staff attending 
meetings; as a rule of thumb, meetings of Task Forces are attended by staff members, 
Working Party and Committee meetings by department heads, and Committee meetings by 
                                                     
2
 The naming of this group is heterogeneous in documents. In one document it is called “Informal Expert Group”, in 
the official OECD workshop report it is called “Steering and Expert Group for the Preparation of the OECD workshop 
New York ‘98”. 
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chief department heads (ix: 200-204). Thus within OECD bodies there is a direct relationship 
between politicization and hierarchy (c.f. Figure 1). 
2.3.3 Working Party on Biotechnology 
An example for internal differentiation that is connected to the constant growth of topics 
within the OECD (see 5.1.1.) is the Working Party on Biotechnology (WPB). It was created in 
March 1994 (OECD 1995) and reports to the Committee of Science and Technology Policy 
(CSTP). 
The WPB itself has a much broader remit than human health related biotechnology and 
included industrial and environmental aspects of biotechnology. Its original objective was: “to 
keep under review and advise upon science, technology and innovation issues in 
biotechnology, with a view to assisting the development of its safe and effective use, by inter 
alia, encouraging the international harmonization of science-based principles and practices, 
and facilitating international scientific and technological collaboration and exchange”. 
In 1998 this objective was reformulated and particularly recognized health care in its mission: 
“the Group will advise upon emerging policy-relevant issues of science, technology and 
innovation related to biotechnology, with a view to assisting the development, application 
and diffusion of products, processes, infrastructure and services which, through industrial 
production, environmental protection and health care, will contribute to sustainable economic 
growth and development, and human welfare. This should be achieved by: encouraging the 
international harmonization of science-based policies, principles and concepts; facilitating 
scientific and technological co-operation, capacity building and exchange; and informing and 
assisting the work of policy-makers in Member countries” (OECD 1998: 316). 
The Working Group on Human Health Related Biotechnology developed from the WPB and 
was formally established in 1995. It deals, as can be concluded from its name, specifically 
with the human health related issues of biotechnology (c.f. iv: 7-10). In 1997 the Working 
Group formed another sub-unit, a Task Force specifically addressing xenotransplantation 
policies. This structure was chosen because the establishment of a formal body would 
require Council authorization; in contrast such a lengthy procedure was not needed for 
creating a temporary informal expert group (c.f. iv: 40-44). 
2.3.4 Secretariat 
Since Committees meet only twice a year and their members are mainly occupied with their 
tasks as civil servants in their home countries, additional expert staff is necessary to carry 
out actual research and analysis. This everyday work is carried out by the Secretariat and its 
divisions, some of which are called Departments, others Directorates. One of them is the 
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Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry (DSTI). Directorates can become relatively 
big. Thus, they are subdivided into smaller divisions, which are again further divided into 
smaller sub-units. Due to these divisions, problems common to big organizations arise, i.e. 
lack of communication and problems of dealing with cross cutting issues. There is also a 
particular informal stratification between Directorates according to the topics they deal with 
(see 2.2). Because of its economic reviews, the most powerful and prestigious is the 
Economics Department (i: 53-57). In comparison, there are also very small unit. For 
example, the biotechnology unit is only staffed with three people (iv: 213-214). 
The Secretariat has a total staff of about 2,500 people (OECD 2008: 12, see also 2.1.2). It 
“parallels the work of committees with each directorate servicing one or more committees, as 
well as committee working parties and sub-groups” (OECD 2008: 14). In practice, a sub-unit 
of a Directorate may "serve" several Committees (v: 172). In this sense, a member of 
Secretariat staff might talk about a Working Party he/she is working for as "my Working 
Party" (i: 123-124). Committees and Directorates come together every six months to present 
and discuss draft documents. Thus, OECD work is done through interactions between 
experts and civil servants (viii: 50-51). This also helps OECD staff to validate their data and 
findings. 
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3 OECD Xenotransplantation Policies 
This section provides an overview of the development of the OECD’s xenotransplantation 
policies (c.f. Table 6). It starts with a short description of the OECD’s interest in 
biotechnology and xenotransplantation and continues with a narrative of the policy 
development from a single-authored background paper to a joint OECD/WHO document on 
xenotransplantation. The chapter ends with a summary of the main features of OECD 
xenotransplantation policies. 
 
Table 1 Timeline and overview of landmark developments 
1996 Policies paper “Advances in Transplantation biotechnology and Animal to 
Human Organ Transplantation (Xenotransplantation)” is published 
25.3.1997 Meeting of the Working Party on Biotechnology to prepare the New York 
Workshop 
1997 Informal Group on Xenotransplantation 
18.-20.3.1999 New York Workshop on Xenotransplantation 
30.11.1999 Framework for Cooperation of the OECD/WHO 
1999 Report on the International workshop on Xenotransplantation 
4.-6.10.2000 OECD/WHO Consultation on Xenotransplantation Surveillance in Paris 
2001 Compilation of regulatory developments in xenotransplantation in OECD 
Member States 
2002 OECD Participation in WHO/Health Canada Internet Discussion Group 
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“The question for many researchers today seems to be, not 
how, but when, xenotransplantation should advance to the 
clinical arena” (OECD 1996: 14, emphasis in the original). 
“What we are trying to do is nurture an evolving technology 
and at the same time be careful because there are inherent 
risks. And do I have the right answer? I don’t know that” (Jay 
Fishman in Shaikh et al. 1998: 247). 
3.1 OECD interest in biotechnology and xenotransplantation 
The quotations at the beginning of this chapter present the aim of OECD’s 
xenotransplantation policy in a nutshell, i.e. xenotransplantation itself is not put into question; 
however, it is made clear that it should be developed in a framework that safeguards the 
protection of public health in a situation of uncertainty. This framework was developed by 
experts, policymakers and industry representatives. 
The OECD’s involvement in biotechnology as a policy area started in the mid-1980s with “a 
series of reports on scientific principles and concepts relevant to safety assessment, and 
socio-economic and other policy issues” (OECD 1996: 3). In the 1990s the OECD started to 
become active in health care related biotechnology and dealt with issues such as live 
vaccines and gene therapy. 
The OECD considers biotechnology as a relevant topic for its own work because, as a civil 
servant put it, "it is one of the strongest sectors of high technology and of enormous potential 
for growth and employment and future employment" (iv: 251-253). In the context of 
biotechnology, the OECD was concerned about competitiveness, trade, trade barriers, and 
heterogeneous policies that would present "a risk of incoherence in the international 
environment" (iv: 255-256), as well as issues of skills and training. The OECD frames 
biotechnology from an economic perspective, and, as an OECD expert explained, according 
to its economic agenda: "so all of this is economics! All of this puts it square into the OECD 
mandate of competitiveness, of trade, of skills and training, of future potential, of high 
technology sectors " (iv: 257-260). In this way xenotransplantation was also considered a 
topic of high economic potential. 
Interest in xenotransplantation developed from previous work of the WPB on gene delivery 
systems and gene therapy and from a white paper, in which WPB members formulated 
research needs (c.f. iv: 22). 
The initiative to investigate xenotransplantation came from the WPB and was promoted by 
several Member States (OECD 1996: 3). It was motivated by the OECD’s “interest in leading 
edge technologies (and their policy implications), and drawing attention to the recent 
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significant biotechnological developments in the field of transplantation” (ibid.). The initiative 
to investigate xenotransplantation was proposed by the UK Department of Health, Health 
Canada and the US Office of Science and Technology Policy. The strongest support and 
push came from the US and the UK, “the leading countries in terms of research”. Both 
countries “were very much in favor to bring this forward and to look at it" (iv: 60-63). From the 
perspective of another civil servant, Canadian representatives were particularly interested in 
creating a policy forum in order to discuss xenotransplantation policy options in an 
international context (x: 194-196). This proposal was also driven by a concern about 
uncontrolled clinical trials, which might take place in developing countries and potentially 
pose a global threat. Canada, the US and the UK were the "lead countries" (ix: 14), that 
wanted to put the topic on the agenda. For that, however it had to meet certain criteria 
developed by the WPB, such as "added value that the OECD can bring”, an “international 
dimension” of the problem, and connection to the “strength of the OECD” (x: 19-21). 
Moreover, necessary funding had to be made available. Xenotransplantation was finally 
selected as a topic because it was interesting for a number of Member States (x: 23-34). The 
Secretariat was asked to write a scoping paper (iv: 96-100), the background paper on 
xenotransplantation, published in 1996. 
3.2 Background paper 
OECD work on regulating xenotransplantation became visible for the public in 1996 with the 
publication of a 28 page “background paper” for “general distribution” titled “Advances in 
Transplantation biotechnology and Animal to Human Organ Transplantation 
(Xenotransplantation)” (OECD 1996: 3). The single-authored paper is based on relevant 
international literature and was written to prepare an OECD workshop on 
xenotransplantation in New York, which was planned for 1997 and actually took place in 
December 1998. 
The paper was written by Dr. Elettra Ronchi, a trained neuroendocrinologist, who worked in 
in the Biotechnology Unit of the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry 
(DSTI) as “Co-coordinator Health and Biotechnology Activities”. She is the key person 
responsible for xenotransplantation policies within the DSTI and dealt with the topic until the 
OECD stopped its activities on xenotransplantation in 2001. 
The background paper starts by sketching the history of transplantation, pointing at early 
failures and the fact that transplantation became an accepted routine practice (ibid. 5).
3
 It 
identifies organ shortage as one consequence of this success and substantiates this 
shortage with figures from the US, the UK and France (ibid. 5 ff.). The document describes 
mechanisms of organ rejection, explains hyperacute rejection, delayed xenograft rejection 
and chronic rejection as well as methods to prevent these effects (ibid. 9f f.). Turning to 
                                                     
3
 For a short summary of this paper see Paslack 2008, 116-118. 
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xenotransplantation, the paper provides a short early history of this approach starting with 
the 1960s and later turning to more recent developments including the UK based firm 
Imutran’s announcement that it would start clinical trials involving humans in 1996. 
Concluding from this research the paper defines what can be called the central framing of 
the OECD’s approach to xenotransplantation: “the question for many researchers today 
seems to be, not how, but when, xenotransplantation should advance to the clinical arena” 
(ibid. 14, emphasis in the original). 
The OECD takes a pragmatic approach towards xenotransplantation. It does not ask, as 
many other national policy documents did, whether xenotransplantation should be further 
developed at all, but poses several questions which it claims should be answered before 
clinical trials could start: “under what conditions should experimentation proceed, and what is 
the minimal goal of the clinical application of xenotransplantation? Are we applying 
premature use of unproven procedures in fellow humans? Is xenotransplantation going to 
provide primarily ‘a bridge’? Is (successful permanent xenotransplantation) an acceptable 
and reasonable target?” (ibid. 14 ff.) 
The OECD paper discusses pigs and baboons as potential donors. In regards to pigs the 
paper explains which organs might be used, refers to current research in Sweden and the 
UK, points at the problem of rejection and strategies to overcome them, and finally poses 
two questions. First, whether, provided that rejection mechanisms are solved, pig organs 
might be “physiologically capable of supporting prolonged human life” and, second, which 
precautions might be necessary “to avoid the transfer of porcine pathogens to the immune 
suppressed human recipient” (ibid. 16). The paper concludes that, “if porcine tissue is to be 
transplanted into humans, guidelines for stringent microbiological programs must be 
developed” (ibid.). Although the paper addresses the need to breed pigs under specific 
pathogen-free conditions, it does not raise ethical questions (e.g. animal welfare) connected 
to this approach in this section. 
In contrast, ethical issues are addressed when the policy paper discusses baboons as 
donors. Baboons could “supply organs on a smaller scale than the pig” but are better 
immunologically compatible with humans (ibid. 17). Possible organs could be the liver and 
heart, although the latter could only be an option for infants and small children because of its 
smaller size. As with pigs, the paper reports that there would be a “pressing concern” of 
transmitting viruses to humans, the behavior of which “in the immunocompromised host 
remains unknown”. Besides practical reasons, such as long pregnancies and small numbers 
of offsprings, the main objections to the use of baboons as source animals are ethical. The 
“close evolutionary relatedness (of primates), creates concern over the ethics” of using them 
as source animals (ibid. 18). The paper concludes that “to breed primates on a large scale 
for organ donation would be contrary to the currently accepted guidelines in various 
countries” (ibid.). 
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Concerning the regulation of xenotransplantation, the paper shortly mentions work being 
done by the WHO, the US as well as the UK. 
The document also discusses economic aspects of xenotransplantation, listing mainly US 
based firms active in the field and pharmaceutical companies developing 
immunosuppressive drugs (ibid. 19ff.). The report concludes that the field “attracted (…) 
significant private investments” (ibid. 21) and transplantation itself “is estimated to produce a 
saving of 63 per cent over total medical expenses for a renal patient when compared to life-
long dialysis treatment” (ibid.). Nevertheless “xenotransplantation will most likely not lead to 
a reduction of average costs” of transplantation. “The costs of the operation will be the same, 
except that the organs will have to be purchased” (ibid.). In addition there would be costs for 
“monitoring xenograft recipients for evidence of diseases” (ibid.). However, to use 
xenotransplantation for bridging “will most likely increase the overall direct costs of 
transplantation, and may be, in the long term, much less cost-effective” (ibid.). 
In its concluding section, the report claims that xenotransplantation is connected to issues of 
global concern, which should be dealt with in international fora. It provides the central 
framing of this report, i.e. safety issues. The paper refers to national guidelines, which 
“suggest a cautious attitude toward xenotransplantation, in particular when primates are 
involved” (ibid. 22). Pointing at recent outbreaks of ebola, hantavirus and dengue fever, the 
author perceives “emerging diseases as a global issue” and therefore a need for 
international harmonization of “guidelines on medical and research practices on 
xenotransplantation”. The WHO would be an ideal organization for such an undertaking. 
Without discussing them in further detail, the paper lists a number of ethical and 
socioeconomic questions, which would be best addressed by UNESCO and the OECD, such 
as: animal rights, alternatives, prevention, impact on health care systems, impact on 
peoples’ readiness to donate organs and patenting of genetically modified animals. The 
paper emphasizes the need for urgent action and advocates international cooperation to 
“ensure that adequate guidelines are promptly in place to enable effective review of clinical 
evidence and to prevent possible public health hazards, at the same time allowing medical 
progress and equitable technology transfer” (ibid.). 
This first publicly available OECD document on xenotransplantation delineates the 
organization’s approach to this new technology: 
 The OECD primarily frames xenotransplantation in terms of the problem of organ 
shortage, sound science and economic considerations. 
 The issue of a moratorium is not addressed. Xenotransplantation is framed by 
technological determinism: it is not the question whether, but when it will happen. 
Therefore the main question is not whether this technology will or should be 
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developed at all – i.e. the then pending question of a moratorium, which was 
discussed in many countries and the Council of Europe -, but under what framework 
it could be put in place most safely.  
 Ethical issues are only mentioned in the context of using baboons or primates, not 
regarding the use of pigs. Other ethical questions are only listed and not discussed 
in any detail. 
3.3 New York Workshop 
After discussing the background paper, the WPB nominated an “Informal Expert Group” to 
organize an international workshop on xenotransplantation. The WPB did not only face the 
challenge to find out what the policy agenda was but also the current state of 
xenotransplantation research: they "realized that there was a need to look at where the 
science was going. The policy agenda was not clear when we first started because the 
science was not yet clear to many" (iv: 63-65). 
This Informal Expert Group met in March 1997 in Paris. It was chaired by David Harper, 
Chief Scientist at the UK’s Department of Health and Chairperson of the WPB as well as of 
the Working Party on Human Health Related Biotechnology. The group included Member 
State delegates
4
, Elettra Ronchi from the Biotechnology Unit, one representative each from 
the WHO and the New York Academy of Science (NYAS) - the host organization of the 
workshop – as well as two industry representatives
5
 (OECD 1999: 102ff.). There were no 
representatives of patient organizations or NGOs in the group. The informal group discussed 
workshop objectives - including title, workshop aims, questions to be addressed, speakers -, 
the outline program, its format, and last but not least, the workshop’s funding.
6
 
The New York Workshop was held from 18-20.3.1998. It was titled “International Issues in 
Transplantation Biotechnology, Including the Use of Non-human cells, Tissues and Organs” 
and was co-organized by the OECD and New York Academy of Science. It was co-financed 
by the Governments of Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the UK and the European 
Commission and supported by the WHO and US Public Health Services agencies. 
3.3.1 Participants 
The New York Workshop brought together participants from 17 OECD Member States, three 
Non-Member States and the EU Commission (OECD 1999: 3). Participants were repeatedly 
addressed as “experts”, “delegates” (ibid. 3; Fishman 1998: x), and “leading experts and 
                                                     
4
 Delegates came from Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and 
the US 
5
 As invited experts representatives of Imutran and Novartis were present. 
6
 About the importance of co-financing for putting issues on the agenda within the OECD see chapter 4. 
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representatives from OECD member countries” (OECD 1999: xix). This indicates the 
character of the meeting as a policy forum organized for representatives from national 
governments and international organizations as well as public research and private industry. 
In its official publication the OECD lists ca. 50 participants (OECD 1998: 89ff.). The Islet 
Foundation, a patient organization lobbying for diabetes patients that participated in the 
workshop, published an unofficial record on the Internet (Islet Foundation n. d.). A 
combination of these two lists results in an attendance of 138 people. Participants were 
nominated delegates of OECD Member States (iv: 336-347). 
Table 2 Participants per Country 
Country Number of Participants 
USA 48 
UK 13 
Switzerland 11 
International Organizations 8 
Canada 9 
Sweden 7 
Germany 6 
Netherlands 6 
France 4 
Italy 4 
Israel 4 
Spain 3 
Austria 2 
Belgium 2 
Norway 2 
Japan 2 
Czech Republic 1 
Finland 1 
Greece 1 
Cameroon 1 
Oman 1 
Portugal 1 
(Source : OECD 1999 ; Islet Foundation n. d., own compilation) 
In terms of country participation, the workshop was dominated by countries with a particular 
interest in xenotransplantation, either because of their own research activities or because 
they hosted industry active in xenotransplantation research (see Table 7). The number of US 
participants was by far the highest with 48 participants, followed by the UK (13), Switzerland 
(11), Canada (9), Sweden (7), Germany and the Netherlands (6 each). 
Looking at the type of participating organizations (see Table 8), the largest group was 
policymakers from national and international organizations (51 participants). Participants 
from research in hospitals, universities, national research institutes and research funding 
organizations added up to 50 people. Industry participation was also a strong group with 26 
I H S — Griessler / OECD Xenotransplantation Policies and Public Participation — 22 
 
representatives.
7
 Seven participants came from Technology Assessment organizations, 
though in the case of Sweden it is hard to distinguish clearly between TA and policy making. 
Only four participants came from NGOs, three of them from patient organizations and one 
from an animal welfare organization. As can be seen from Table 8, according to the type of 
organizations the workshop was dominated by expert, government-and industry involvement 
with little participation from NGOs and the public. 
Table 3 Participants per Type of Organization 
Type of organization Number of 
participants 
National and international regulatory authority 51 
Research at hospitals, universities, national research institutes; 
research funding 
50 
Industry 25 
Technology Assessment 7 
NGO 4 
(Source: OECD 1999 ; Islet Foundation n. d., own compilation) 
3.3.2 Format 
With formal presentations and alternating plenary and parallel sessions, the workshop 
followed the regular model of a scientific conference. Sessions included formal 
presentations, which were followed by discussions as well as question/answer sessions. 
Uncommon for a scientific conference and more common at policy events, the workshop had 
a general rapporteur and a rapporteur for each of the two days. 
An introductory section, including welcoming addresses by the organizers and a keynote 
speech by molecular biologist and Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg set the stage for the 
meeting. The introduction was followed by two parallel sessions on “Infectious Disease Risk” 
and “Safety and Quality. The Challenge of International Surveillance”. This was again 
followed by a second set of parallel sessions, one on “Immunology and Xenografts: Science 
and Perspective”, the other on “Social, Legal and Ethical Aspects”. Session IV was 
dedicated to an “International Policy Forum” and the concluding session on “Policy 
considerations”. During the last session the general rapporteur encouraged and replied to 
comments from the audience. 
The public was addressed in a press conference in which representatives from the OECD, 
WHO, national regulation authorities and researchers provided short statements and 
answered questions of journalists (Shaikh et al. 1998). 
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 This group includes 20 participants from the US, 4 from Switzerland and one each from UK and Canada. 
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3.3.3 Objectives and Issues 
As can be seen from the type of audience, the workshop’s aim was to get information about 
the state of the art in xenotransplantation research and related areas as well as national and 
international policy making in order to facilitate coordinated international xenotransplantation 
policies; this goal was formulated in the opening speech by WPB Chairman David Harper. In 
his words, the workshop was intended to “guide OECD member countries towards 
international coordination and the establishment of coherent international policies and 
regulations on xenotransplantation” (Harper 1998: xix). It should “discuss and formulate an 
OECD opinion on current developments on xenotransplantation to be condensed in a series 
of policy considerations for OECD member countries” (ibid.). The OECD wanted to build on 
existing experiences of experts and policymakers. David Harper expressed this goal by 
addressing the expert audience: “many of you here belong to advisory groups or committees 
that have or are about to formulate guidelines on this new technology. (…) We wish to build 
our discussions on your experience” (ibid.). 
Following the framing in the 1996 background paper, the WPB Chairman contextualized 
xenotransplantation again by portraying transplantation as an accepted practice, which 
became a “victim of its own success” (ibid.). He asked the audience several questions, which 
the members of the Informal Expert Group already had agreed upon beforehand in a 
preparatory meeting (ibid. xx ff.): 
1. What is “the actual burden to society of diseases where xenotransplantation may 
have a role”? What alternatives exist to alleviate organ shortage? 
2. “What are the available or possible alternatives derived from recent technological 
advances”? 
3. What are the “xenozoonotic risks” and “which public health tools are currently 
available or are being developed to prevent the risk of inadvertent transmission of 
infectious agents into xenotransplant recipients”? 
4. Which “informative analogies” can “be drawn between gene therapy and 
xenotransplantation”? 
5. Which “public health tools are currently available or being developed to reduce or 
eliminate the risk of inadvertent transmission of infectious agents into 
xenotransplantation recipients”? 
6. What are the “features of a compatible international framework to detect, identify, 
monitor, evaluate, and manage xenozoonotic risks”? 
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7. How can international organizations such as the OECD “enable the establishment of 
effective frameworks and infrastructures” necessary for the clinical practice of 
xenotransplantation? 
These questions would later guide the workshop conclusions published in a report (OECD 
1999: 73). 
Jay Fishman, co-editor of the records of the New York Workshop and expert in infectious 
diseases related to transplantation, and his colleagues framed the workshop’s objective 
slightly differently (Fishman et al. 1998: x): 
1. “to provide background information concerning progress and controversies in the 
field of xenotransplantation in the areas of immunology, infectious disease, animal 
husbandry, and medical ethics and public policy; 
2. to discuss those issues of particular importance to the development of international 
strategies and a regulatory framework for the protection and benefit of public health; 
and 
3. to identify issues and approaches relevant to developing regions.” 
The question whether xenotransplantation should be further developed or whether a 
moratorium should be imposed was not an explicit question of this workshop. Although a few 
presentations shortly mentioned the issue of a moratorium, most papers were clearly 
oriented downstream and instead addressed questions on how to put xenotransplantation 
into practice safely.
8
 
In other words, the workshop was dominated by the question of how to put 
xenotransplantation into practice. Of the 39 formal presentations
9
 most were dedicated to the 
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 In his introduction David Harper only mentioned the issue of a moratorium when he referred to different positions 
towards xenotransplantation held in OECD Member States and mentioned the Council of Europe’s debate, which 
would call “on a hold on clinical trials until further research shows that the technology is safe and offers real 
benefits” (Harper 1998: xxi). André LaPrairie and D. Brodie, two civil servants from Health Canada, also addressed 
the issue of a moratorium and reported that the Canadian National Forum on Xenotransplantation agreed not to 
recommend a moratorium because “a moratorium is not the best medium for controlling research behavior in that it 
can pre-empt proactive public discussion and remove the issue from the public’s mind” (1998: 174). 
Abdallah S. Daar, a surgeon from the Sultanate of Oman, addressed the question of a moratorium: “some scientists 
active in xenotransplantation research have gone so far as to argue for a moratorium in the United States because 
of the need to involve the public in more detailed discussions before embarking on clinical trials” (Daar 1998: 230).  
In a final press conference, Jay Fishman explained why he was no longer in favor of a moratorium. His intention for 
a moratorium was to discuss the “potential for third-party risk” and to have “public involvement in oversight”. In his 
opinion, this discussion has been led by the US Public Health Services, which also developed “ an oversight 
committee to address the concerns of laypeople, lawyers, ethicists, other individuals in addition to scientists who 
have relevant opinions in this area” (Shaikh et al. 1998: 239). 
9
 Not counting the rapporteur’s addresses in the sessions. 
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related areas of risk of infection (6 papers), necessary surveillance (10 papers) and 
appropriate policies (4 papers). Five papers addressed issues of allotransplantation, i.e. 
broadly speaking the transplantation of human organs into humans and the organisation of 
organ procurement. Another five papers addressed questions of immunology. Three papers 
dealt with public perception and the other two with the development of xenotransplantation 
and animal welfare respectively. The rest of the papers contained opening and concluding 
remarks (4 papers).  
As already mentioned, the OECD did not ask the question whether a moratorium would be 
necessary or not, but framed xenotransplantation as a development that eventually is going 
to happen and which, in order to be safe, should be regulated. An example for this is the 
paper by Fishman and his colleagues. They also did not address the issue of a moratorium 
explicitly but instead defined the goal of xenotransplantation regulation as promoting the safe 
development of this technology: “the goal of regulatory efforts must be to assure continued 
progress in the field while exerting a maximal effort to assure clinical efficacy and public 
safety” (Fishman et al. 1998: xi). Fishman et al. advocated continued research as well as 
flexible and “dynamic” regulation, which could be made more or less stringent according to 
the development of research and relevant research results. 
The following section will not look into the details of the presentations but will focus on the 
way in which public perception of xenotransplantation, and potential involvement of the 
public, were discussed. 
3.3.4 Public Involvement 
Researchers and policymakers took different approaches on how to conceive of and involve 
the public. These approaches can be categorized into three types: the first two - involvement 
as helplessness and involvement as public relations - perceive the public as an uninformed 
outsider, whereas the third - involvement as participation – attempts to include the public into 
regulation. 
3.3.4.1 Involvement as Public Relations 
A first approach to public involvement that perceives the public as outside of research and 
regulation is involvement as public relations. This approach tries to anticipate public reaction 
and sensibility. It is well aware of public attitudes and it tries to avoid pitfalls. The aim is to 
persuade the public of one’s cause. Involvement with the public is perceived as achieving 
acceptance. As Tallacchini put it, public involvement is only acknowledged “instrumentally, 
namely to provide evidence and support for xenotransplantation from the public” (Tallacchini 
2007: 357) 
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Abdallah S. Daar’s presentation provides an example of this approach. He stated that “while 
it seems foolish to predict the public’s response to xenotransplantation, an attempt is 
nevertheless worth our while, if only to identify and try to avoid pitfalls and achieve the 
desired response” (Daar 1998: 223). Previous experiences shall “help us draw conclusions 
about what to avoid” (ibid.). Public reaction should be predictable and is perceived as being 
based on certain factors. These are: “(1) past experience; (2) studies of attitudes; (3) 
knowledge of cultures; and (4) certain additional factors predicated on perceptions (e.g., on 
the adequacy of the scientific base, public education, honesty, etc.)” (ibid. 224). 
According to this approach public confidence is to be gained and carefully nurtured. 
Xenotransplantation has to be “sold” (ibid. 228) to the public and “how the public is ‘sold’ the 
idea of xenotransplantation will also likely affect the exact response” (ibid.). 
Abdallah Daar reiterated previous clinical xenotransplantation experiments and facts that 
contributed to public awareness. He referred to the public via opinion polls as a survey 
public. However, for methodological reasons he was not uncritical of existing studies that 
had used questionnaires and focus groups. How do you address problems, which are not 
known? What do respondents know about the details of xenotransplantation? He described 
several scenarios, which would negatively affect public opinion. These included “ill-planned” 
transplant from non-human primates, discovery of new dangerous viruses, death of a patient 
from a pig virus infection, discrediting of an oversight authority to fulfill its tasks and creation 
of “widespread negative publicity” (ibid. 228). Daar concluded his presentation with lessons 
learned and set out a strategic map for gaining public acceptance, which included the role of 
the public (“publicity cuts both ways”), media (“can be fickle”), lobbying (“it works”), the 
importance of primacy, the imponderability of research, the uncertainty about infection risk, 
the easiness to find patients for clinical trials, the role of animal groups in shaping public 
attitude, the role of patients’ advocacy groups (balancing the negative publicity of animal 
rights groups), and differences between the United States and Europe with regards to a 
moratorium (Europe being more in favor of a moratorium than the US). He also agreed to the 
necessity of some sort of “community consent” but said that “at present we have no sensible 
idea how to obtain such consent” (ibid. 230). 
The strategic and instrumental approach to public involvement differs notably from the 
second and third approaches presented in the workshop, i.e. involvement as helplessness 
and involvement as participation. 
3.3.4.2 Involvement as Helplessness 
During the workshop, regulators and experts appealed regularly for the involvement of the 
public in a xenotransplantation debate. However, concrete suggestions of how to put this into 
practice and actual steps towards public involvement were almost nonexistent at the 
conference. This type of relationship with the public might be called involvement as 
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helplessness. This means that actors acknowledged the importance of public debate from 
time to time but this appeal remained mere rhetoric because no practical plans for how to 
accomplish this were mentioned. 
Eric van Rongen, chairman of the Dutch Xenotransplantation Advisory Committee provided 
an example of this approach. He presented the Dutch Committee’s recommendations, which 
stated that “it (the Committee) would consequently like to see information made available 
and the encouragement of public debate on these matters” (van Rongen 1998: 180). 
However, he did not delineate a process for how this might be realized. 
Rashid Shaikh, from the New York Academy of Science, provided another example by 
stating that one should be sensitive about public perception and acceptance by including 
issues such as trust, religious and cultural values. “The public perception of risk is central to 
the acceptability and successful implementation of clinical xenotransplantation. (…) It is 
important to be sensitive of these issues in formulating national and international policy” 
(Shaikh et al. 1998: 203ff.). But he also did not provide an answer on how this goal might be 
accomplished. 
At a press conference Jay Fishman brought this helplessness to the point by stating that “the 
question was: how do we best involve the public in discussions of a risk that potentially 
involves the public at large? It is clear that we don’t know the answer to that.” (Jay Fishman 
in Shaikh et al. 1998: 247). 
As will be shown later in this paper, the involvement as helplessness together with 
involvement as public relations approach was also dominant within the OECD. 
3.3.4.3 Involvement as Participation 
André LaPrairie and D. Brodie (1998), two policymakers from Health Canada, addressed the 
problem of loss of public confidence in government regulation, which was caused by 
increasing threats – they provided HIV and mad cow disease as examples - and previous 
regulatory failings. Regulators would also face society’s additional demand to “look beyond 
safety and risk management and address overriding issues of ethics and economics” (ibid. 
171). They therefore concluded that public demand on regulation had increased and it had 
become increasingly difficult to satisfy. Their approach to regulation, which might be called 
involvement as participation, therefore emphasized “not only decisional efficiency, but also 
transparency, participation, and accountability” (ibid. 172). Participation would lead to 
transparency, and consequently would contribute to trust in regulatory bodies and 
regulations. They therefore argued for open decision-making processes involving the public: 
“Negative impressions of government have been linked to a poor understanding of how 
government decisions are actually made. Openness in regulatory decision-making means 
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that stakeholders – including the public – are given reasonable notice, reasonable 
opportunity to observe the decision-making process and reasonable access to relevant 
government documents and information. Participation in regulatory processes, while not as 
accepted a practice, may also lead to better perception of transparency” (ibid. 172). 
Another problem they addressed in their presentation were the differences between experts’ 
and the public’s risk perception. They argued: “the information provided by experts or 
regulators may be accurate, but if it does not address public perceptions or fears it will only 
compound the issue and increase public anxiety. This risk information vacuum can also 
amplify perceived risk and decrease trust in the regulator” (ibid. 172). 
This was also a challenge for xenotransplantation, which would raise “psychological, cultural 
and societal concerns that require frank public debate and the dissemination of accurate 
information” (ibid. 173). They therefore argued for a regulatory strategy emphasizing 
openness to the public and building of trust: 
“Public communication and consultation are fundamental elements in the development of 
any regulatory framework. The benefits of public confidence must be understood by the 
regulator so that resources appropriate to this objective can be obtained. How the regulator 
manages and communicates the scientific, social, cultural, legal, and ethical issues of 
biotechnology such as xenotransplantation will influence public trust in both the technology 
and the regulator” (ibid. 175). 
This approach, which is open for framing by the public, is consistent with the participatory 
approach taken by Health Canada in discussing Canadian xenotransplantation policies 
(Einsiedel et al. 2011). 
Another example for appeals to involve the public is Jay Fishman. In his introductory article 
he claimed that there is a central role for authorities to exchange information but “the public 
must be informed and involved in the developmental process for regulatory guidelines” 
(Fishman et al. 1998: xii). In a press conference he reported that his initial motive to support 
a moratorium was to involve the public in discussing the potential risk of xenotransplantation 
for society. The installation of oversight of xenotransplantation satisfied this need in his 
opinion (Shaikh et al. 1998: 239, 247). 
3.3.5 Output 
The OECD New York Workshop resulted in two kinds of output. The first was a special issue 
of the Annals of the New York Academy of Science published in the same year (Annals New 
York Academy of Sciences 1998). This scientific publication provides all presentations with 
the exception of the concluding session. The second output was the official document 
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“Xenotransplantation. International Policy Issues”, which was published one year later 
(OECD 1999). The following section deals with this publication. 
3.4 Xenotransplantation - International Policy Issues 
The 1999 OECD report was written by Elletra Ronchi, who already prepared the 1996 
background paper and was the person within the Secretariat who played the largest part in 
organizing the New York Workshop. 
The report is based on the presentations, transcripts of round table discussions and 
comments raised at the New York Workshop and is complemented by more recent scientific 
reports and regulatory developments. Drawing on Elletra Ronchi’s background paper from 
1996, it additionally provides an overview on policy issues in xenotransplantation and on 
international xenotransplantation policies. 
However, the report differs from the 1996 background paper in one important way. As stated 
in its foreword, the document was edited and commented on by speakers, panel discussion 
members and rapporteurs. In contrast to the 1996 single-authored background paper, it has 
been read and accepted by competent researchers in the field of xenotransplantation and 
related areas and policymakers who participated in the New York Workshop. Moreover, it 
was submitted to the WPB’S Working Group on Human-health-related Biotechnologies and 
was discussed at one of its meetings (OECD 1999: 3). It became an official publication of the 
Secretary-General of the OECD. Thus, acceptance by experts, policymakers and OECD 
bodies strengthened the paper’s legitimacy and social robustness as a policy document (see 
2.1.4, 5.1.4). 
3.4.1 Content 
In this paper xenotransplantation is again framed in the context of transplantation research, 
which is presented as successful, widely accepted and, as a result facing, the problem of 
organ shortage. The report discusses organ procurement as a means of improving donation 
rates, providing Spain as an example for a successful organization of transplantation. Similar 
to the 1996 background paper, it discusses immunological hurdles of transplantation and 
methods to overcome rejection. Turning to xenotransplantation, the report provides a history 
of its development, and discusses pigs and baboons as donors and the respective 
physiological problems and infection risks. The report enters into international policy issues 
with xenotransplantation, providing information about international surveillance (notification, 
registry systems, archive system), international cooperation and developments of national 
and international draft guidelines on xenotransplantation in the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, 
Switzerland, France, Germany, the US, Canada, the UK, the WHO and the Council of 
Europe. After mentioning lessons learned in gene-therapy, enterprises involved in 
xenotransplantation research are listed and economic aspects of this therapeutic approach 
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are discussed. The report refers to legal and ethical aspects, addressing legal issues, animal 
welfare and husbandry, public perception and developing countries. The report ends with 
some concluding considerations. The following section will focus on the perception of the 
public as well as on general conclusions. 
3.4.1.1 Public Perception 
The report recognizes a “fundamental need to stir social debate on the complex issues 
raised by xenotransplantation” (OECD: 1999: 69) and “international discussion” (ibid.). 
Taking up the formulation of Sergio Bellucci et al (1998), a group of Swiss and German 
researchers who carried out a qualitative survey on attitudes towards xenotransplantation, it 
reports that xenotransplantation in public discussion “is still considered more of a promise 
than a remedy” and as uncertain as its alternatives (ibid.). Resonating LaPrarie and Brodie’s 
(1998) workshop contribution, it states that, “public confidence in the process of policy 
development is an essential element of a regulatory framework”. It argues against a 
moratorium, again following LaPrarie’s and Brodie’s argumentation, that “such legislation 
tends to cut off public debate and create a (false?) (sic!) sense of resolution whereas in fact, 
the technique may well be developed elsewhere”. The OECD approach is instead to “strictly 
enforce guidelines, with as much international consensus as possible, together with an 
ongoing ethical, scientific and public review of what is ethically permissible and scientifically 
possible and safe way constitute more effective means of oversight” (ibid. 70). OECD 1999 
quotes directly from Jay Fishman (1998), when it states that “ethical principles are generally 
universal, but need interpretation in the light of local cultures, religions, economics, and laws. 
Legal protection must be established to provide human dignity and autonomy and to avoid 
the perception of exploitation in the developing world by the sponsors of novel technologies” 
(Fishman et al. 1998: xi). 
How does this report conceive of a public debate? Public debate “should be informative and 
transparent, since low public confidence may be the result of a lack of information. The 
information put forward by experts and regulators may be accurate but if it does not address 
public perceptions or fears, public anxieties are very likely to increase. Thus, the use of 
terminology and language is very important and public debate should address psychology as 
much as science” (ibid. 70). How things are presented will be important: “one can anticipate 
high acceptance rates if the benefit to mankind is clear, ambivalence if the outcome is 
uncertain and strong disapproval if the process is perceived primarily as a source of 
commercial profit” (ibid. 71). However, no suggestions are made in the document about the 
format of such public debate. The public is perceived as an outsider who has to be won over 
by appropriate strategies, communication wording and techniques. The OECD therefore, in 
the same way as several of the experts’ presentations at the New York Workshop, perceives 
of public involvement as a mixture of helplessness and public relations. 
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3.4.1.2 Ethical issues 
The document lists a number of ethical concerns that need to be addressed: 
 “may not be consistent with striving for humane and fair medicine; 
 may conflict with efforts to develop better approaches to preventive medicine; 
 may conflict with efforts to keep medical costs down; 
 may contribute to the development of multi-tier medicine; 
 may discourage donation of organs for allotransplantation” (ibid. 71). 
However, although these problems are listed, they are not discussed in depth, neither at the 
conference, nor in the report. 
3.4.1.3 Conclusions 
The OECD report concludes that 
 The economic impact of xenotransplantation is so far not adequately addressed in 
international discussion. 
 Alternatives to xenotransplantation should be further pursued, including prevention 
and alternative approaches such as artificial organs and tissue engineering. 
Moreover, measures to increase organ procurement should be continued. However 
this will not be sufficient to alleviate organ shortage. 
 Xenotransplantation necessitates the establishment of a global and wide-ranging 
surveillance regime, which includes risk assessment, risk prevention (by appropriate 
animal husbandry and lifelong patient monitoring), risk management, archives, 
guidelines, international standards, notification system, and registries. The OECD 
and other international organizations can play a role in that. Industry has to be 
involved in these efforts. 
 Animal welfare should be at the highest possible standards and there is need for 
international harmonization in that. 
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 In general xenotransplantation might become a reality; a global surveillance 
regiment will be necessary; the public has to trust science and regulators and proper 
communication is necessary to ensure that. 
In summary, a civil servant remembered the workshop as important to promoting an 
international dialogue and to setting the stage for policy making: 
“it created international momentum, it created a base for international dialogue and it did 
point towards a few of the real major issues that needed to be addressed but it also 
cautioned that it was not going to resolve at that point, the shortage of donors. It gave 
everybody a sense that perhaps progress was going to be slower than one would think. 
There were many questions that were to be resolved and so policy-makers did not have to 
feel that they were under pressure and the biggest issue as I said that was then started to be 
discussed here was how then to act at policy level. Should we let it happen? How should we 
let it happen? How should the international community then go about it? Should we have 
some code of conduct in place? How to put in place the appropriate surveillance? Should 
there be a moratorium or not? Should we stop and wait? Is that feasible? So in some ways it 
created the right environment to ask all of these questions but it could not answer them all” 
(iv: 319-330). 
3.5 Paris Workshop 
3.5.1 Framework Agreement between OECD and WHO 
On 30.11.1999 the OECD published a framework for co-operation between the OECD and 
the WHO, which among other topics lists cooperation “to develop guidance on surveillance 
and biosafety in relation to organ transplantation biotechnology, in particular 
xenotransplantation”. These should build on various WHO activities in this area as well as on 
the OECD New York Workshop. During 1999-2001 the organizations will aim “at developing 
a shared system for monitoring advances in regulatory frameworks in these areas” (OECD 
1999: 3). 
3.5.2 Objective 
The OECD/WHO Consultation on Xenotransplantation Surveillance took place from 4-6 
October 2000 at the OECD Headquarter in Paris. The Consultation was jointly sponsored by 
the OECD, WHO and Health Canada. 
The goal of the Consultation was to assemble “epidemiologists, infectious disease 
specialists, clinicians, industry, government and international organization representatives 
and others working in public health and xenotransplantation research to discuss and 
exchange ideas on the desirability of and possible approaches to xenotransplantation and 
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associated infectious disease surveillance, both at country level and internationally” 
(OECD/WHO 2001: 4). The purpose was therefore a further step downstream towards the 
realization of xenotransplantation. It was no longer a question whether clinical trials in 
xenotransplantation should be carried out but how they should be regulated nationally and 
internationally in terms of risk prevention and surveillance. 
The questions posed in the consultation where therefore: (1) how can a xenogenic infectious 
disease event be defined? (2) Which lessons from existing surveillance systems can be 
drawn for xenotransplantation? (3) How can existing surveillance systems be adapted to the 
specifics of xenotransplantation? (4) Which ethical considerations have to be considered in 
surveillance systems? (5) What might a practical framework for international surveillance 
look like? (c.f. ibid.). 
3.5.3 Participants 
Table 4 Participants by Country 
Country Number of participants 
France 8 
UK 8 
USA 7 
NL 4 
CH 3 
CAN 3 
Germany 3 
WHO 3 
European Commission 2 
Italy 2 
OECD 2 
Spain 2 
Sweden 1 
AUT 1 
AUS 1 
Belgium 1 
Denmark 1 
Japan 1 
Oman 1 
Thailand 1 
UNDP 1 
 56 
(Source: OECD/WHO 2001) 
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Table 9 shows that with approximately 50 participants the Paris Consultation was much 
smaller than the New York Workshop. Again the US and the UK were the countries with the 
most participants. However, given that the meeting was in Paris, there were many 
participants from organizations located in France, which accounts for the relatively high 
number of participants labeled as “French”. Again, Member State representatives as well as 
representatives of UN organizations and the European Commission were present. 
Regulators were the largest group, followed by researchers in academia, hospitals and 
national research institutes and industry (see Table 10). 
Table 5 Participants per type of organisation 
Type of organization Number of 
participants 
National and international regulatory authority 26 
Research at hospitals, universities, national research institutes; 
research funding 16 
Industry 8 
International Organizations 6 
 56 
(Source: OECD/WHO 2001) 
3.5.4 Output 
As described in a “note by the secretariat” the report was again prepared by Elettra Ronchi 
with “contribution and input” from a WHO official and notes from the rapporteur of the 
consultation. Again, the report was distributed for comment to participants and revised 
thereafter. The revised report was submitted to the Working Group on Human Health-
Related Biotechnologies and the WPB and became declassified by the Committee for 
Scientific and Technological Policy (CSTP) on 19. October 2001 (OECD/WHO 2001: 2). 
Thus it is a final and official document of the OECD. Moreover, being a joint document of two 
international organizations, its social robustness was again amplified. 
OECD/WHO policy can be summarized in general as being positive towards 
xenotransplantation, however, with an emphasis on strict surveillance and international 
cooperation. Since “significant scientific advances are rapidly paving the way to 
xenotransplantation” and because “of the potential risk of xenogenic pathogens”, the report 
states that “international surveillance for xenotransplantation-associated infectious disease is 
needed” (ibid. 4). The objective of such surveillance would be to “detect and report 
xenotransplantation-derived infectious disease events” (…) share information and 
cooperation; facilitate xenogeneic disease events verification and response co-ordination” 
(ibid. 5). Countries that want to carry out clinical trials agree to “designate resources to 
establish a national xenotransplantation surveillance system” and a “xenotransplantation 
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registry” and “facilitate international exchange of information, which protects the 
confidentiality of individual patients and investigators” (ibid.). Information sharing and 
cooperation should build upon existing infrastructures and the WHO, OECD and Council of 
Europe should take leadership roles in that. 
Most of the document is rather technical and goes into details about finding a consensual 
definition of xenotransplantation and adapting existing systems of informing, monitoring, 
controlling, breeding and reaching standards necessary for safe xenotransplantation to be 
carried out. Although it would be interesting to analyze in detail how the public is positioned 
by the proposed surveillance system, the following section will limit its scope to the way in 
which the document explicitly talks about the public. 
The section “ethical considerations in xenotransplantation surveillance” starts out with the 
notion that experiences with applications of biotechnology proved that debate with the public 
on social and ethical issues would be crucial for acceptance (ibid. 20). This would also be 
the case for xenotransplantation, which would need addressing of a “broad range of ethical 
implications, including the feasibility of xenotransplantation and of the surveillance schemes” 
(ibid.). The report lists five unresolved questions of xenotransplantation surveillance, which 
would need consideration: “(1) protection of patients’ privacy and confidentiality. (2) Conflicts 
between private vs. public interests. (3) The potential for infringement of human rights of first 
recipients. (4) Intersection between domestic and international law. (5) Appropriate action in 
the case of xenogeneic infection” (ibid. 20). 
The document also briefly raises the question of “how can the public be engaged in a 
meaningful way?” (ibid.). But it does not address this question in any way; instead it 
immediately goes on to discuss the ethical problems of xenotransplantation clinical trials for 
individuals (ibid. 21). Thus, again, public involvement is dealt with as helplessness. 
With the Paris Workshop, the OECD’s involvement slowly fades. In the aftermath of the 
conference, Health Canada and the WHO organized an Electronic Discussion Group (WHO 
1999). Elettra Ronchi participated as moderator, but the OECD did not the organizing. 
Furthermore, the OECD compiled a data base of regulatory developments in 
xenotransplantation in OECD Member States, which has not been updated since 2001.
10
 
3.6 Summary of OECD xenotransplantation policies 
In summary, OECD xenotransplantation policies have several main characteristics: 
OECD activities were triggered by Member States and contributed to putting 
xenotransplantation on an international agenda. The OECD achieved this by providing a 
                                                     
10
 http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,2578,en_2649_34537_1783767_1_1_1_1,00.html, download: 14.08.09. 
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policy forum of mutual exchange with its workshops and reports. This, according to an 
interviewed civil servant, "stimulated a great deal of international discussion, which of itself 
(…) was very helpful" (x: 88-90). 
The OECD framed xenotransplantation in the context of science, the interests of 
transplantation patients, public health and economics. It discussed xenotransplantation from 
a perspective on organ shortage, risk prevention and surveillance, its benefits for people 
waiting for transplantation as well as the economic impact of xenotransplantation. 
Instead of a moratorium, the OECD favored harmonized international surveillance. It 
contributed to the formulation of elements of such a global surveillance system. 
The OECD perceived a moratorium as a controversial issue because the Council of Europe 
was discussing it at that time. According to a civil servant, the OECD did not consider a 
moratorium as a “good tool" in a "global" and "international environment" because 
"somewhere it's going to happen" (iv: 165-175). The attitude taken was therefore: "we know 
that eventually there could be a risk of something happening, so let's see what we need to 
put in place in order to avoid (...) the hazard" (iv: 175-177). Thus, "the so called OECD 
approach which meant ‘No we are not going moratorium we are going for close, very close 
regulation, very careful regulation’" (iv: 444-445). One reason for that was the concern that a 
moratorium would export the problem to less developed countries where it was outside 
surveillance: “We just didn´t think that that was going to work because the science and the 
trials were still going to go ahead and the worse of it all they might have even been exported 
outside of the OECD countries where the regulatory frameworks were in place" (iv: 458-460). 
Finally, the OECD moved the agenda to the WHO. 
A OECD civil servant recalled that the WHO had problems in getting a political mandate to 
look into xenotransplantation. The OECD had an important role in putting 
xenotransplantation on the agenda of this other international organization: it "pushed the 
recommendation at the executive board of the WHO" (iv: 239-244). Because of its lack of 
legal competence, the OECD thought that it had done its job by organizing the New York 
Workshop and the OECD/WHO Consultation; “there were recommendations and the 
recommendations were directed at other organizations that was appropriate, other 
organizations, either international organizations, sister organizations or in fact national 
governments and it was for others to pick up those recommendations. (…) There is no 
mandate for the OECD to instruct other organization to work in these areas” (x: 113-127). 
After the OECD/WHO Consultation the topic moved to the WHO and the international online 
consultation (iv: 370-379). When it came to the details of the surveillance system "it was 
clear that much of this really needed WHO action at this point" (iv: 431-432). 
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4 Actors 
The following section shortly describes the actors engaged in the aforementioned policy 
process. 
4.1 National Governments 
National governments played an important role in whether and in what way 
xenotransplantation was dealt with in the OECD. National governments of the US, UK and 
Canada were putting xenotransplantation on the agenda via their delegates in the WPB. 
They were doing this because of their own needs; the UK and the US as countries hosting 
leading research, and Canada, because it struggled with appropriate xenotransplantation 
regulation. Together with the governments of Germany and Switzerland they co-financed the 
New York Workshop and thereby promoted an international exchange. They provided their 
experiences at the workshops and contributed to and decided upon international standards. 
4.2 Committee and Working Groups 
The WPB played a fundamental role by putting xenotransplantation on the OECD work 
programme, defining the issues to be addressed and funding this activity. The WPB 
conveyed legitimacy to OECD documents by declassifying and acknowledging them as 
official papers. 
4.3 Secretariat 
Although the Biotechnology Unit, with only three employees, is anything but a big unit, the 
OECD Secretariat was central for the development of OECD xenotransplantation policies. A 
single civil servant, Mrs. Elettra Ronchi, did the main share of the detailed work of pulling 
together scientific information, drafting and rewriting reports, planning and organizing 
workshops, keeping records and editing documents. Different from the WPB members, who 
assembled twice a year, this civil servant continuously dealt with the tasks for a long period 
of time. In doing that, she expanded her network of key actors in research, industry, national 
governments and international organisations. 
4.4 Researchers 
Researchers were a very strong group within the OECD network. First, many national 
delegates were trained as researchers (civil servants were often also scientists, and national 
governments also nominated researchers as delegates). Second, the responsible civil 
servant in the OECD, as already said, was a trained scientist. Third, naturally researchers 
were “the” core experts, the insiders in xenotransplantation. They knew about 
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transplantation, physiology, immunology, infection risk, cloning, genetics, veterinary 
medicine, etc. Thus, researchers were already involved as members of the WPB and more 
experts were invited as additional key informants. Experts played a fundamental role in 
developing OECD policy. As an interview partner recalled: "the experts were involved 
absolutely critically in the early stages of defining the issues, to examine further and these 
were experts at a national level, but very quickly plugged into the OECD machinery. They 
were involved throughout in drafting information, in presenting and helping to facilitate the 
meeting and in helping with the final reports when they were produced" (x: 98-102). 
4.5 Industry 
The OECD focused on xenotransplantation from an economic angle: What can 
biotechnology do for economies? What are the obstacles? Industry was therefore very 
strongly involved in policy making, e.g., in the preparation of the New York Workshop (see 
3.3) and in attending the workshops (see 3.3.1, 3.5.3). 
4.6 NGOs 
In contrast to experts, policymakers and industry, only few NGOs were involved in OECD 
policy making. NGOs were not involved in the preparation of the New York Workshop and 
only three NGOs attended the conference, i.e. two patient organisations and one NGO, 
advocating animal welfare. 
One of the NGOs present was the Islet Foundation, which attended the meeting with two 
people for “representing the interests of the diabetic community” (Islet Foundation n. d. 2). It 
perceived xenotransplantation potentially “as the only hope for a cure in the near future”. It 
argued against a moratorium because “any regulatory impediments to the advancement of 
xenotransplantation would have serious consequences for those seeking to end diabetes” 
(ibid.). Because several countries were thinking about a moratorium it “was essential that our 
voice be heard in an international forum were such regulatory arguments would be aired”. 
They reported that the workshops gave them the impression that “it was generally 
recognized that the benefits of xenotransplantation are enormous and the risks manageable” 
(ibid.). They wanted to speed up the process towards clinical trials. “Now it’s time for some 
action. By this time next year there should be some real progress, and we must not find 
ourselves still talking about the same things. This is all about clinical trials, not about endless 
process” (ibid. 2). 
4.7 Public 
As can be seen from the previous actors, the OECD used a close and closed international 
network from national and international policy making, research and industry. The public was 
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only included via press conferences and the possibility to read the reports, which were 
published on paper or the Internet. 
5 Social Practices 
The following section is dedicated to social practices within the OECD that have an impact 
on the potential of citizen involvement. It will analyze how topics are put on the OECD’s 
agenda and how OECD activities are funded. It will continue by discussing the OECD’s “idea 
game”, the organization’s impact on national policy making, the importance of consensus 
within the OECD and the process of declassification. This will be followed by a summary of 
the role the public is playing in the OECD’s policy making. 
5.1 Social Practices in the Field of Policy Making 
5.1.1 Putting Topics on the Agenda 
One organizational process that respondents frequently addressed in interviews was the 
constant differentiation of topics and a strong tendency to create new Working Parties. There 
is a dialectic relationship between extending the scope of topics according to necessity and 
limiting their number to a workable size. An interview partner criticized the OECD for 
engaging with too many topics and for the creation of new Working Parties each year despite 
their already great number (iii: 85-87). In principle, the Council would therefore want to limit 
their number; a counter argument to this policy of limiting growth was put forward by another 
interview partner, who argued that the OECD could not seriously consider itself to be a think 
tank if it would neglect important topics (vi: 74-82). Thus, there is a certain tension between 
these two approaches. For the scope of this paper it is important to notice that, as in any 
other organization, topics emerge, develop and sometimes disappear within the OECD. The 
central questions therefore are: how does the OECD arrive at new topics and who takes the 
initiative in that? 
The subjects the OECD intends to deal with are laid down in a so-called “work program”. 
This paper, which is renewed every two years, defines tasks and working areas. Together 
with the budget it is a key instrument for planning. What is on the work program and 
budgeted for will be dealt with. Any OECD actor who wants to have a particular topic on the 
agenda has to make sure that it is put in the work program. Topics are first discussed and 
negotiated at the Committee level and then aggregated in the work program (v: 206-212, 
218-221). There are several ways to get an issue on the agenda. 
Topics often develop from previous activities in Committees (vii: 143-151). As one OECD 
expert put it: "in practice it is often the case that things result from previous work and are a 
sort of continuation" (v: 227-232). 
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Sometimes Member States take initiative within a specialized Committee or Working Party 
and ask the Secretariat to deal with a topic (vii: 126-140, see 3.1). This is preceded by 
informal exchange between Member State representatives. Several interview partners 
emphasized the fact that the OECD is "Member State driven" (ix: 3); that means it is 
primarily Member States that define OECD activities (i: 88-94, ix: 39-40). They announce 
their requirements and needs in the Committees (v: 232-234). They are the ones who have 
the last word because "finally, the competence is with the Member States, finally Member 
States have to approve of the plans" (v: 235-236). 
However, not only Committees but also the Council or the Executive Committee might put a 
topic on the research agenda because they might consider it as a basic decision and top 
priority (see 2.3.1). The topic “green growth”, which was recently intensely discussed in the 
OECD, is an example of this "top-down-approach" (vii: 73-89, 154-156). 
Initiative to look into a policy area can come, and this is very often the case, from the 
Secretariat itself. One interview partner gave an example of how in the early 1990s a staff 
member initiated the OECD’s involvement in health policy from scratch within the already 
existent policy area of social policy because he considered it an important topic (interview i: 
16-18, 39-43). 
In practice topics are selected in cooperation and consensus between the Secretariat, the 
chair of a Working Party and a Committee. As a civil servant explains, "it can emanate from 
the committee, it can emanate from the Secretariat. Particularly in the Working Party on 
Biotechnology there are a number of very active countries, which are also represented in the 
board, and proposals for topics are literally coming from all sides" (ix: 144-147). The 
discussion and selection of future topics is not settled once and for all but it is a constant 
issue at each meeting (ix: 129-140). At times there might be tensions between different 
actors, whether an issue should be dealt with or not. A Committee, for instance, might 
consider a topic, the Secretariat proposed as less important and decline to look into it 
(vii: 143-151). In this situation, a rejected topic might reemerge through the backdoor 
because the Secretariat still wants to continue with an activity it has been engaged in for 
years (ii: 106-111 and Committee and Secretariat might even come into a "close fight" (ii: 
110) over the work program. One interviewee called this process "persuasion between 
partners" (v: 234). 
In summary, topics do not develop quasi naturally but have to be put on the agenda. There 
are certain reasons why different topics are on the agenda and others are not, i.e. there are 
certain interests involved in certain topics. Sometimes there are frictions between different 
OECD bodies and also between Member States about making an issue topical or not. 
Xenotransplantation was not a core topic of the OECD but rather marginal to its interest. It 
was put on the agenda by several Member States who had an interest in looking into the 
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area and putting it on the international agenda because of research activities in their own 
countries and/or concern about the implications of risk and public health. 
5.1.2 Funding 
Appropriate funding is an important bottleneck for any actor who wants to put an activity on 
the OECD agenda. The OECD is funded by its Member States, in the form of 
basic - obligatory contributions based on the country’s Gross Domestic Product - and 
additional funding, the so called voluntary contributions. Several interview partners explained 
that basic funding was often insufficient to carry out necessary work. The OECD would lack 
money and basic funding would cover only 50 to 75% of its costs (ix: 89). Money for 
analytical projects would often be short (i: 88-94). Obligatory funds cover “secretariat 
salaries, missions, paper, internal operations”. However, in order to do additional activities 
“voluntary contributions (…) are necessary to fund workshops, to fund case studies" (iv: 212-
219). 
It therefore often needs additional funding by voluntary contributions from Member States to 
put a topic on the agenda and finance an activity. It is either a group of countries or, in rare 
cases, a single country that finances such additional activities (i: 104-107). It is one of the 
tasks of Committee Chairs and the Secretariat "to fill the work program with life" and to raise 
voluntary contributions (ix: 95-96). 
Voluntary contributions, which increased "enormously" in recent years (iii: 30-32), were also 
critical in the case of xenotransplantation. They came, as previously mentioned, from a 
number of Member States, which were particularly interested in the topic (see 3.1). David 
Harper, the Chairman of WPB and the Working Party of Human Health Related 
Biotechnology, was a UK delegate from the Department of Health and was particularly 
interested in the topic. Several Member States co-financed the New York Workshop (see 
3.3) and the Paris Consultation (see 3.5.2) and therefore made OECD engagement possible. 
5.1.3 “Idea game” 
The OECD does not distribute money (OECD 2008: 13). It “provides a setting for reflection 
and discussion, based on policy research and analysis, that helps governments shape policy 
that may lead to a formal agreement among member governments or be acted on in 
domestic or other international fora” (OECD 2008: 13). Because it neither distributes money, 
nor issues formal legislation to any significant extent, the OECD “is bound to play”, as 
Marcussen put it, “the so called idea game” (Marcussen 2004: 15, see 1.1). So how does the 
OECD actually play this game? 
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5.1.3.1 Bringing Together Experts 
One way of playing the idea game is to create and promote a network of actors active in 
xenotransplantation policies. Workshops, consultations and Internet discussions were means 
to this end. 
At the time of the New York Workshop, the workshop format was already an established 
instrument within the OECD’s human health related biotechnology policy. The New York 
Workshop was preceded by similar events on “Non Target-Effects of Live Vaccines” in 1992, 
“Gene Delivery Systems” in 1995 and “Novel Systems for the Study of Human Disease” in 
1996 (OECD 1996: 3). As Michael Oborne, Deputy Director of the Directorate for Science, 
Technology and Industry at the OECD mentioned in his introductory comments at the New 
York Workshop: “the OECD community used the workshop as a means to facilitate 
exchange of experience, the development of common concepts and approaches. We hope 
that this workshop can achieve similar objectives and will lay the grounds for productive 
international co-operation and co-ordination” (Oborne 1998: xviii). 
The New York Workshop was a place where people active in xenotransplantation research 
and policy making were deliberately brought together by the OECD to exchange their 
experiences. As can be seen from other CIT-PART case studies, actors who were relevant 
in their national xenotransplantation policy from Austria (Griessler/Biegelbauer 2012), 
Canada (Einsiedel et al. 2011), the Netherlands (Versteeg/Loeber 2011), Sweden 
(Hansson/Lundin 2011), Switzerland (Griessler 2011) and the UK (Brown/ Beynon-Jones 
2011) as well as Council of Europe and WHO representatives participated in this meeting. 
However, the New York Workshop and the OECD/WHO Consultation were not the only 
events where this international network met. Jay Fishman et al. (1998: ix) in their preface 
referred to “three years of intensive discussion on the part of regulatory authorities, 
transplant physicians, scientists, ethicists, and other experts sponsored by public health 
agencies of the United States, Great Britain and Canada, by the Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academy of Science, by the World Health Organization, and other organizations 
concerned with the issue”. The OECD/WHO-Consultation builds directly on experiences 
gained in previous international settings such as a WHO Consultation, The Canadian Forum 
1997 (Einsiedel et al. 2011), the OECD New York Workshop and the Meeting of UKXIRA in 
1999. This indicates that the international dynamics of xenotransplantation regulation were 
based on an interweaving network of experts, industry representatives and national as well 
as international regulatory organizations. 
5.1.3.2 Distributing Documents and Policies 
In the context of labour market and welfare policy, Dostal points out (2004: 441) that studies 
from the EU and the OECD “provided each other with additional legitimacy and set the 
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agenda for (…) reforms” (2004: 441). UK committees such as the Nuffield Council for 
Bioethics (1996) and the Kennedy report (Advisory Group on the Ethics of 
Xenotransplantation 1997) were the first who worked out recommendations on the ethics 
and social acceptability of xenotransplantation. These first movers were very influential for 
defining the ethics of xenotransplantation because they set the stage for later national and 
international committees and were often quoted as authorities on the subject.
11
 The OECD 
contributed to the dissemination of authoritative papers of early movers by publishing their 
summaries in its documents (OECD 1996, 1999). 
More importantly, however, the OECD’s own documents which were published in 1996, 1999 
and 2000 as well as its website helped to distribute policy ideas on xenotransplantation. 
5.1.4 Declassification 
How does the OECD arrive at a report? As has been pointed out in this paper, there was a 
single civil servant within the Secretariat who drafted and wrote all the documents based on 
literature and minutes. The drafts were then submitted to experts and participants at the New 
York Workshop and the OECD/WHO Consultation who were invited to make informal 
comments. But there is also a formal discussion and clearance process. Every six months 
the Committees meet for a discussion of activities and documents. When the document is 
finally finished it is “declassified” by the Member States as an OECD document (vi: 55-59). 
Declassification "is neither problematic nor a formality, they (the Secretariat) often get a lot of 
feedback. In this sense it is important (...). (...) Sometimes it might happen that there are 
different opinions about a topic, which (the Committee) is made aware of. (...) In principle (...) 
it is a matter, which we perceive rather positively. We get a lot of feedback and a lot of things 
are brought to our attention we did not know" (v: 280-287). 
As already mentioned, there is a degree of stratification within OECD bodies (see: 2.3.2). 
Working Parties are at an expert level, Committees operate at the level of civil servants and 
Council at the level of Ambassadors. If conflicts occur during declassification, an attempt is 
made to solve them at an expert level in the Working Party because at that level there is the 
most expertise. Civil servants and, to an even greater degree, ambassadors are less familiar 
with the topic. If settlement on Working Party level is impossible the issue moves to the 
Committee. If no solution is found at this level, which is an exceptional case, it moves up to 
the ambassador level. The process to declassify a document is called “declassification” (vi: 
66-73). 
                                                     
11
 They can be used to legitimate one’s own position, e.g. in the Dutch case: “The committee has taken note of the 
elaborate ethical considerations of the Nuffield Council of Bioethics and the Advisory Group on the Ethics of 
Xenotransplantation, both from the United Kingdom, and agrees with their conclusions” (van Rongen 1998: 179). 
The Dutch Committee came to the conclusion that “from a human point of view, xenotransplantation is ethically 
acceptable” (ibid. 180). 
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Declassification is not necessary in all OECD areas. In the case of xenotransplantation, the 
document went to the Working Party, to the Committee and "then a notice goes to Council. 
They don't have to say yes/no but it goes" there (iv: 383-388). 
5.1.5 Consensus 
Declassification means that the OECD has to approve of a document officially in a formal 
procedure. In this sense the OECD is a "consensus club" (iii: 46), a "consensus 
organization". The OECD is a "soft law think thank" (vii: 16) and makes consensual 
recommendations. Within the OECD there is an emphasis on trying to involve countries and 
on trying to get a consensus even when their policies are criticized. Thus, there is little voting 
in Committees, the development of guidelines and agreements is an "interactive" process 
between Member States (v: 12-13, ix: 156-160). According to a civil servant, critics might call 
this a "diluted" consensus. 
5.1.6 Impact 
In contrast to the European Union, which can directly issue regulations, directives and 
decisions, the OECD mostly works with soft law instruments such as best practices, 
recommendations, guidelines and agreements (v: 8-12, ix: 115-116). It is up to the Member 
States to decide how to make use of OECD results. No Member State is obliged or forced to 
accept recommendations. This soft law character provides the OECD with room for 
maneuver. It is a possibility for the OECD to bring together politics and science (vii: 23). 
The OECD’s impact derives from communication between experts and policymakers (policy 
forum), but also from peer review pressure among Member States (i. 100-102). As a civil 
servant described „there is a soft, it’s not a tough, but a soft peer pressure" amongst civil 
servants in the OECD (v: 475-480). This is also recognized by the OECD, who states that 
“peer pressure can act as a powerful incentive to improve policy” (OECD 2008. 7). Peer 
pressure works particularly in the area of economic country surveys (Noaksson/Jacobsson 
2003). 
OECD results can be used by policymakers for policy learning, either by supporting their own 
position, but, and this might be less pleasant, also as a critique of their policy. OECD can 
help to bring domestic political debates on an objective level (iii: 453-471). As a respondent 
explained: "It is tremendously helpful if one is able to say: ‘this is not only something the 
WIFO and the IHS (two Austrian research institutes) are saying, but that's something others 
are saying as well’" (iii: 544-546). One way to promote the impact of OECD analysis on 
domestic policy is inviting OECD staff to events in one's own country (v: 444-469). 
Learning from the OECD however, is impeded by lack of time. The OECD Secretariat would 
be able to work continuously and for several years on one and the same topic. In contrast, 
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national civil servants because of their duties at their own countries and the EU would simply 
lack the time to go into a matter in such a detail; the impact of OECD documents would 
therefore vary to a great extent from topic to topic and country to country (iii 209-220). 
5.2 Social Practices in the Field of Citizen Participation 
There is no direct public participation in the OECD. The idea within the OECD is, that the 
public is represented by representative democracy. Committee members carry the political 
mandate of their elected governments and represent the public in that way (i: 144-145). The 
OECD's work is influenced by current political concerns via the organization’s "political 
strand", i.e., the Secretary General and the OECD’s political super structure of Council and 
Standing Committees. 
An exception to this model is the involvement of traditional interests. The Trade Union 
Advisory Committee (TUAC) and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) 
have privileged access to the OECD (vii: 380-387). Both of them are allowed to participate in 
meetings as observers. They can ask questions but cannot file petitions. Moreover, they 
have to leave the room when decisions are made (ix: 279-296). 
As a senior diplomat observed, in comparison to other international organizations, NGOs in 
the OECD are not a driving force and their integration is not very strong (ix: 31-34). The 
public plays a comparatively small role and apart from TUAC and BIAC there is little 
involvement (ix: 267). 
The fact that there is little public involvement is best expressed by an interview partner who 
claimed that they did not perceive the OECD as “an open organization; instead, it's simply 
the case that civil servants sit inside (the OECD) and work with the problems they perceive, 
they identify" (vii: 346-348). Drawing from the interviews, public involvement apart from 
information is simply not part of the organization’s self perception, which seems to be 
dominated by a deficit model according to which which lay people would lack sufficient 
knowledge to be involved. To inform the public would be a difficult task, which would not 
necessarily benefit the policy outcome. 
According to one interviewee, the “OECD standard procedures provide for anything else 
than by the broader public, that's not the concept and idea, but the idea is, the OECD is an 
expert organization which answers questions posed to it" (ii: 24-27). According to another 
informant, the public is not involved and would be overburdened by the topics discussed. 
OECD documents would be very technical and only declassified documents are open to the 
public (vi: 95-99). This technocratic view is also shared by a respondent who said that, "the 
topics are highly complex (...) and the investment in time and resources necessary to involve 
a broad public would exceed the potential benefit" (ix: 300-302). This lack of public 
involvement is not perceived as a problem in the OECD’s self-conception. The issues 
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discussed would be "very, very technical" and "the involvement of a broader public would 
probably not really be a benefit to the discussion" (ix: 274-275) because there would be 
great need for explanation. The policy process is perceived as driven by sound science and 
not by political negotiations. As an interview partner recalled the discussion on 
xenotransplantation: "this was (…) an expert driven process that was the (…) heart of the 
work that the Working Party did. So it was as far as evidence based approach it could be" (x: 
233-235). 
However, some informants stated that the OECD would have a public relation problem and 
would increasingly try in recent years to reach the public. This discussion seems to be more 
about selling the OECD to the public and how the public might use the OECD’s output in 
terms of reports and data bases (vii: 94-104) than about public participation (vii: 87-90). 
In summary, OECD documents provided different approaches to public involvement. 
Member State delegates at the New York Workshop presented approaches to citizen 
involvement such as involvement as public relations, involvement as helplessness and 
involvement as participation. Health Canada, e.g., presented a participatory approach which 
remained in stark contrast to the one the OECD used in its own policy development process 
and declared in its documents, in which public involvement was perceived as a mixture of 
helplessness and public relations. 
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6 Conclusions 
The OECD’s xenotransplantation policies - which included implicit technology 
assessment - developed through sequential interaction between the OECD Biotechnology 
Unit, the CSTP, its Working Parties, policymakers in international organisations and external 
experts. 
The process started with the WPB’s putting xenotransplantation on its work programme. This 
initiative was Member State driven and originated from the US, the UK and Canada. The 
WPB asked the Secretariat’s Biotechnology Unit for a background paper to prepare a 
workshop, a format, which had already been applied twice for policy development within the 
WPB. The background paper was based on international literature and national statistics 
from the UK, the US and France and was subsequently discussed with, and authorized by 
the WPB. After passing a procedural shortcut, it was published as an official OECD 
document without having gone through the regular lengthy declassification process. 
In order to organize the New York Workshop, the WPB installed an Informal Expert Group. 
The aim of the Workshop was to invite policymakers and experts to learn more about the 
science of xenotransplantation and necessary regulation. This Informal Expert Group laid 
down the workshop format, defined questions to be addressed and suggested speakers. The 
Member States were invited to nominate delegates. The conference included plenary 
sessions, formal presentations, questions and answers, and several rapporteurs. 
At the New York Workshop experts from policy making and research (public and industry) 
addressed the questions posed by the Informal Expert Group in presentations. The papers 
were published in the Annals of the New York Academy of Science. The Workshop also 
resulted in an official OECD policy document. The expert in the Biotechnology Unit, who was 
responsible for the topic xenotransplantation, wrote another policy document which 
combined her former background paper with insights from presentations and conclusions 
from the Workshop. This document was presented to speakers for comments, revised and 
finally presented to the WPB for declassification. After a formal declassification process, it 
became an official OECD document. 
The process did not stop at this point. The OECD organized a follow up event, this time in 
cooperation with the WHO, in order to develop guidance for international surveillance. The 
event took the form of a consultation. Again, the OECD/WHO Consultation was first planned 
and staged by a small group of experts and policymakers. Questions addressed in this 
preparatory stage were, e.g.: what is the purpose of the conference? Who is going to be 
invited? Who is going to chair what session? Who is going to be rapporteur? The 
Consultation followed the format of formal presentation and round table discussions. A 
rapporteur kept record of discussions and summarized them in a document, which was again 
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distributed to participants for comments. The latter were included in the draft paper and the 
revised paper was finally declassified by the CSTP. After being cleared, the documents 
again became an official document. However, this time it was authorized by two international 
organizations, the OECD and the WHO. 
This process of policy development and implicit technology assessment took place, as just 
outlined, at many places within the OECD: the Biotechnology Unit, the Informal Expert 
Group, the Working Party on Human Health Related Biotechnology, the WPB, the CSTP, as 
well as at the New York Workshop and the OECD/WHO Consultation. It was driven by an 
international regulatory network, which included policymakers from Member States, 
international organizations and researchers from academia and private industry. The 
Biotechnology Unit orchestrated the OECD contribution to this international regulatory 
process. 
The OECD framed xenotransplantation not as “whether” but as “when and how” it would 
happen. It mainly framed xenotransplantation in the context of organ shortage, sound 
science and economics. In the course of the two subsequent workshops in 1998 and 2000 
the questions dealt with became increasingly downstream oriented and practical in the sense 
of how to put xenotransplantation safely into clinical practice. The OECD was not in favor of 
a moratorium because it considered it ineffective. Its policy approach was safe implantation 
and, as a necessary prerequisite, international surveillance. Ethical issues were listed in 
OECD documents but never discussed in any greater detail. 
The OECD does not possess strong generalized symbolic media to advance its policies. In 
contrast to economic surveys, peer pressure is not very strong in the area of biotechnology 
in the OECD. It is therefore even more bound to playing the idea game to promote its 
policies. Together with the Council of Europe and the WHO, the OECD played an important 
role in putting xenotransplantation on the international agenda. It assembled key actors, 
provided an international platform, published documents, co-operated with the WHO to 
initiate international standards for surveillance and clinical practices, and finally moved the 
topic to the WHO. 
The Biotechnology Unit is a very small unit in DSTI, which again is not the most prestigious 
OECD Directorate (see 2.2). Routine practices employed in policy making were: putting a 
topic on the agenda, writing official documents by a (single) staff member based on her own 
research, organizing workshops and consultations, arbitrating with the WHO and Member 
State representatives, and discussing and declassifying documents in an organization that 
has been described as a consensus club that can only issue soft regulation. Artifacts 
produced in this process include official documents (declassified reports, participant lists, 
and agendas) as well as unofficial documents (draft agendas). 
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The aim of the technology assessment was to exchange information, to acquire knowledge 
about the current state of the art research, to inform policy makers and experts about 
xenotransplantation and to recommend options for policy making on xenotransplantation. 
The Outcome of this processes were policy papers and recommendations. 
Experts and policymakers in the OECD debated the topic of xenotransplantation. There was 
little NGO involvement, no citizen participation and no PTA. Citizens were only involved as 
consumers of official reports and information provided via the internet. The public, as 
perceived in OECD documents, was an opaque and silent majority, which OECD actors 
were unsure, and lacked knowledge about. They were perceived as media consumers and 
potential patients. 
Gender related questions were not addressed in the process of policy development. 
Public participation played almost no role in OECD xenotransplantation policies. In the 
context of citizen participation, the OECD can be characterized as impermeable for several 
reasons. 
 The OECD is an etatist and political organisation, which, to advance its policies, 
engenders political mechanisms of powering within and between Member States. 
Member states not only have to define a political position in their home 
countries - which already often involves conflicts that require resolution - there are 
also political conflicts between OECD Member States caused by their different 
interests and positions. Examples of such tensions that needed political resolution 
mentioned in interviews, concerned research on international pricing of 
pharmaceuticals and the regulation of human genetic testing. Citizen participation 
would add to the complexity of this already highly demanding and complicated 
political process. Within the OECD settlement of such conflicts is mainly 
accomplished through an emphasis on consensus (declassification), arbitration, soft 
law and peer pressure. 
 The OECD is a think tank and an expert organisation: it deals with topics that are 
often highly complex and technical with a perspective of sound science. The easiest 
way to get information about such issues is to ask other experts. In addition, 
Committee members and Secretariat staff are also often trained as scientists or 
economists. They are part of an international expert network. 
 The OECD is an elite organization, the access to which is highly selective. 
Committee members are either government representatives themselves or experts, 
nominated by their governments. Participants at conferences are also Member State 
nominees. 
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 The OECD reproduces its own epistemic community; as an elite, expert and political 
organization, the OECD reproduces a fairly closed and homogenous international 
network of policymakers, experts and industry representative (BIAC). Access for 
non-experts and non-policymakers is extremely difficult. 
 The expert and policymaker network decides whether issues become topical and in 
what way they are framed. Issues, in order to be discussed, have to become topical 
in the aforementioned close network, which is remote from the public and NGOs. 
Moreover, in order to deal with an issue, additional funding is often necessary, which 
again has to be provided by Member States. 
 Because of the basic economic mission of the OECD, the closed expert and 
policymaker network, and the difficulties of finding consensus in politics on ethical 
issues, xenotransplantation is framed rather narrowly in the context of economics 
and sound science. Although ethical and upstream questions are raised in policy 
documents, they are rarely discussed. Issues discussed are focused on how to put 
xenotransplantation into safe practice. This pragmatic and seemingly apolitical 
approach is in itself highly political, making it difficult to address upstream questions. 
 Within the OECD the deficit model is still dominant, which mainly considers the 
public as ignorant. In this model the public is excluded from policy making. Though 
the question of how to involve citizens is often asked in OECD documents, practical 
solutions to actually doing it are rarely given. Though the importance of the public for 
the acceptance of technologies is recognized, it is still perceived as an outsider, 
whose trust and acceptance has to be achieved. The OECD approach to citizen 
involvement is therefore a mixture of helplessness and public relations. 
NGOs - apart TUAC and BIAC – are little involved. Even national parliaments are 
considered as outsiders from the OECD’s perspective. The public is not perceived 
as an actor who might contribute important ideas or knowledge to the policy process. 
It is considered as being represented by indirect political representation of Member 
State governments. Citizens are only informed through press conferences, the 
Internet and publications. Within the OECD, there is no dialogue with but a 
discussion about the public. 
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